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ABSTRACT
Despite generating thousands of cases on important public issues, the single
subject rule remains a source of judicial confusion and inconsistency. The root of the
problem lies in the inability to define the term “subject” using legal doctrine. This paper
reexamines the single subject rule through the lens of public choice theory and finds that
its purposes are wrongheaded. Logrolling is not necessarily harmful, and improving
political transparency requires legislative compromises to be packaged together rather
than spread across multiple acts. Riding is not a form of logrolling but an analytically
distinct and more threatening practice. This analysis yields a precise, political definition
of “subject” and a new framework for resolving single subject disputes.
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The indeterminacy of the term “subject,” … cannot be overcome by synonyms,
paraphrases, and tautological formulas. It can either be replaced or supplemented by a
formula that sets out some concrete goals or operational directives, or measures will be
left to continual case-by-case decisions under standards so meaningless that it is difficult
to avoid ad hoc … reactions to the merits of individual measures.**
INTRODUCTION
In October 2004, a district court in Louisiana invalidated astate constitutional
amendment banning gay marriage less than three weeks after voters expressed
overwhelming support for it on a statewide ballot.1 The court did not base its decision on
substantive principles of equal protection or fundamental rights. Rather, its intrusion into
social policy was justified by a procedural provision in the state constitution: the single
subject rule. The rule requires the state legislature to confine all acts to a single subject.2
The purpose of the rule is to combat various forms oflegislative misconduct.3
Louisiana’s legislature designed the amendment to ban not only gay marriages but also
civil unions, and the court found that these dual aims constituted separate subjects in
violation of the rule.4 To underscore that the infirmity was purely procedural, the court
made clear that separate amendments to ban gay marriage and civil unions would be
constitutionally sound.5 Single subject challenges to anti-gay marriage laws have also
been raised in Georgia and Kentucky, and similar litigation is anticipated in Arizona.6
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Oregon Education Assoc. v. Phillips, 727 P.2d 602, 612 (Ore. 1986) (Linde, J., concurring).
See Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So.2d 715 (La. 2005) (recounting the history of the
district court case). Seventy-eight percent of voters supported the amendment. See id. at 718.
2
See LA. CONST. art. 3, § 15(A) (“Every bill, except the general appropriation bill and bills for the
enactment, rearrangement, codification, or revision of a system of laws, shall be confined to one object.”).
The Louisiana Constitution is one of several to use the term “object” rather than “subject.” In practice,
there is no difference between these formulations. See Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More
Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389, 395 (1958).
3
See infra Part I.B.
4
See McKeithen, 893 So.2d at 721-22.
5
See Ed Anderson, “Same-sex marriage ban is nullified,” The Times Picayune, Oct. 6, 2004.
6
See O’Kelley v. Cox, 604 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. 2004); Wood v. Com. Ex. Rel. Grayson, 2005 WL 1258921,
Ky. Cir. Cit, May 25, 2005; Chip Scutari, Democrat Joins High Court; Napolitano Ally Creates 3-2
Majority Among Arizona’s Justices, The Arizona Republic, June 15, 2005, p. 1A (reporting that the
1
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These particular cases, though mostly unsuccessful,7 represent the latest in a
string of high-profile attacks on legislation that rely on the single subject rule. In the last
century-and-a-half, Louisiana’s courts have dealt with over 300 single subject challenges
to bills addressing everything from the definition of murder to jurisdiction over the state’s
Department of Environmental Quality.8 Together, courts in Georgia and Kentucky have
resolved over 500 single subject disputeson matters ranging from tort liability to sexual
offenses.9 Thirty-nine other states have some version of the single subject rule embedded
in their constitutions,10 and collectively they have tried over7,000 cases , including
several hundred in the last few years, on a wide variety of topics.11
Many single subject cases have resulted in the invalidation of substantial and
important legislation. In Simmons-Harris v. Goff, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down
the state’s school voucher program on single subject grounds.12 In Senate v. Jones, the
California Supreme Court struck down a ballot initiative that would have transferred
power to reapportion political districts to the judiciary.13 In People v. Cervantes, the
Illinois Supreme Court dismissed a gunrunning charge against a defendant because the

Arizona Supreme Court may soon face a single subject challenge to a proposed initiative that would ban
same-sex marriage).
7
See McKeithen, 893 So.2d at 737 (overturning the Louisiana district court’s decision); O’Kelley, 604
S.E.2d at 775 (refusing to use the single subject rule to invalidate a proposed initiative to ban marriage
before Georgians voted on the measure); Wood, 2005 WL 1258921 at *7-8 (ruling that a state constitutional
amendment to ban gay marriage does not violate Kentucky’s single subject rule).
8
On the frequency of single subject litigation, see infra Part I.C. On the definition of murder, see State v.
Cooper, 382 So.2d 963 (La. 1980). On jurisdiction, see In re Matter of Rubicon, Inc., 670 So.2d 475 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1996).
9
On the frequency of single subject litigation, see infra Part I.C. On tort liability, see Mullis v. Southern
Co. Services, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. 1982). On sexual offenses, see Martinez v. Com., 72 S.W.3d 581
(Ky. 2002).
10
See Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 963 (1999); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on
Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title
Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 165-66 (2001).
11
See infra Part I.C.
12
711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
13
988 P.2d 1089 (1999).
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underlying statute—the Safe Neighborhoods Law, which was intended to combat gangs,
drugs, and other problems—violated the single subject rule and was invalidated.14 This
decision led to a “nationally publicized furor in the Illinois legislature.”15
Legal scholars have spilled much ink debating the merits of the single subject
rule,16 and most agree that, despite its benign intent, it suffers from a fundamental flaw:
no one can define a “subject.”17 Consequently, it is difficult to determine when a bill
contains more than one. As a California Supreme Court Justice recently stated, “the term
‘subject’ is problematic … because almost any two legislative measures may be
considered part of the same subject if that subject is defined with sufficient abstraction.”18
This has led to uncertainty among judges. Reading single subject opinions leaves no
doubt that courts struggle with the rule.
Perhaps because of the rule’s ambiguity, courts have been criticized for their
handling of it. Judges have been accused of deciding single subject cases

14

See People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1999).
Dragich, supra note 10, at 107.
16
Recent, helpful discussions of the application of the rule to legislation include Stephanie Hoffer & Travis
McDade, Of Disunity and Logrolling: Ohio’s One-Subject Rule and the Very Evils It Was Designed to
Prevent, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 557 (2004); Dragich, supra note 10; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 173 (2000); James
Preston Schuck, Comment, Returning the “One” to Ohio’s One-Subject Rule, 28 CAP. U.L. REV. 899
(2000); Denning & Smith, supra note 10; M. Albert Figinski, Maryland’s Constitutional One-Subject Rule:
Neither A Dead Letter Nor An Undue Restriction, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 363 (1998). Recent, helpful
discussions of the rule in the context of initiatives include Rachael Downey et el., A Survey of the Single
Subject Rule as Applied to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2004); Daniel H.
Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J. 35 (2002); Gerald F. Uelmen,
Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives After Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 999 (2001); P.K. Jameson & Marsha Hosack, Citizen initiatives in Florida: An Analysis of
Florida’s Constitutional Initiative Process, Issues and Alternatives, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 417 (1995).
The seminal discussion of single subject rules is Ruud, supra note 2.
17
See, e.g., Courtney Paige Odishaw, Note, Curbing Legislative Chaos: Executive Choice or
Congressional Responsibility, 74 IOWA L. REV. 227, 242 (1988) (“The main obstacle to the complete
effectiveness of single subject restrictions … is the legislators’ and courts’ inability to define ‘single
subject’ precisely”); Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 1171, 1177
(1993) (“The notion of a subject is inherently incapable of precise definition.”).
18
Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 37 (Cal. 2002) (Moreno, J., concurring) (citing Daniel H.
Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L.REV. 936, 938-942 (1983)).
15

3

inconsistently,19 failing to explain the reasoning behind their decisions,20 permitting
substantive legal considerations to influence procedural questions,21 and imposing their
personal beliefs under the guise of the rule’s broad language.22 Relatedly, confusion
surrounding the rule almost certainly leads to enforcement problems. Without clear
guidelines for resolving single subject disputes, courts may uphold acts that deserve to be
invalidated and strike down acts that should not be disturbed. Judges themselves
recognize at least some of these problems. As a member of the Ohio Supreme Court
recently exclaimed, “[t]his court continues to utilize the one-subject rule to invalidate
legislation with little consistency or reason.”23
Judges, legislators, and society as a whole would benefit from a more coherent
single subject jurisprudence. The volume of single subject litigation is substantial, and
many of the cases involve laws addressing important public issues. Moreover, resolution
of single subject disputes raises the classic countermajoritarian difficulty. Unelected
judges must review and strike down laws passed by a majority of representatives or, in
the case of initiatives, private citizens. Finally, the salience of the rule has increased in
recent years, as judges in many states have adopted a more aggressive stance towards
single subject enforcement, striking down more laws and injecting themselves deeper into
the legislative process.24 Taken together, these facts make clear that the single subject

19

See, e.g., infra note 23 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at 995-96.
21
See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 40 (discussing the California Supreme Court’s reliance on
substantive principles of fairness to help decide a single subject case).
22
See, e.g., id.
23
State ex. rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Employees Ass’n v. State Employment Relations Board, 818 N.E.2d 688,
706 (Ohio 2004) (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
24
See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 35 (“The recent change in judicial application of the single
subject rule [to initiatives] has been dramatic. For better or for worse, critics who have called for more
aggressive application of the … rule are getting their way”); see also Dragich, supra note 10, at 107
(discussing recent, relatively strict application of the rule to legislation in Minnesota, Missouri, and
20
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rule plays a momentous role in state constitutional law and policy. That the rule itself
remains ill-defined and judicially unmanageable is troubling.
My aim in this paper is to reconceive single subject jurisprudence, both by
providing a precise definition of “subject” and by formulating a new judicial test for
compliance with the rule. I will not try to delineate the contours of a “subject” byusing
legal doctrine, which is fruitless.25 Rather, I will scrutinize the single subject rule
through the lens of politics. To that end, my work is grounded in public choice theory,
the application of economic principles to political institutions.26 This approach permits
progress where other, more doctrinal takes on the single subject rule have failed.
I will begin by examining the traditional purposes of the rule. The single subject
rule was designed to: (1) prevent “logrolling,” the process of combining multiple
proposals, some or all of which command only minority support, into an omnibus bill that
will receive majority support27; (2) eliminate “riders,” unpopular provisions that are
attached to otherwise popular bills28; and (3) improve political transparency, both for
citizens and politicians.29 I will show that logrolling results from exchange; legislators
trade votes to garner support for their favored provisions. This process always leaves a

Illinois); Kelly L. Bonanno, City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth: A Cynic’s View of the Single-Subject
Requirement and Germaneness Test, 14 WIDENER L.J. 605 (2005) (discussing recent, relatively strict
application of the rule to legislation in Pennsylvania); Hoffer & McDade, supra note 16, at 558 (referring to
Ohio’s single subject rule as a “powerful arrow in the quiver of a supreme court increasingly willing to use
it”).
25
On the difficulties in defining subjects based on legal doctrine alone, see infra Part II.B.
26
On public choice generally, see, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003).
27
See Ruud, supra note 2Error! Bookmark not defined., at 391. Logrolling is usually understood to take
place only between proposals that individually lack majority support. However, legislative roadblocks—
including, for example, committee approvals and filibusters—can prevent even overwhelmingly popular
bills from becoming law. To surmount those barriers, supporters of popular bills sometimes have to
logroll. Although this paper focuses on logrolling among proposals that individually lack majority support,
the analysis for all kinds of logrolling is the same.
28
See id.
29
See id.; Turnbull v. Fink, 668 A.2d 1370, 1383 (Del. 1995) (Holland, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
purpose of the single subject rule is to ensure that the content of bills is brought to the public attention).
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majority of legislators better off, though it may cause severe harm to a minority. In
contrast, riders do not result from exchange but rather a manipulation of legislative
procedures. Well-placed legislators can attach self-serving measures to otherwise
popular bills, and they need not offer anything to the measures’ opponents.
Consequently, riding always leaves a majority of legislators worse off, though it may
yield a significant benefit to a minority. Finally, I will explain that confining acts to a
single subject can cut against political transparency. Rigidly separating bills can make it
difficult to grasp the compromises that underpin legislation.
In light of this analysis, I will argue that one of the fundamental purposes of the
single subject rule is wrongheaded: the rule should not be used to prevent logrolling.
Logrolls can be socially beneficial or harmful, and courts cannot possibly filter one from
the other on a case-by- case basis. Doing so would require more information than courts
will ever possess. A better approach is to adopt a presumption for or against logrolling
and apply it in every case. I will argue that logrolling tends to be beneficial and that
judicial intervention in this area causes more harm than good. Thus, the presumption
against logrolling embodied in single subject jurisprudence is inapt.
In contrast to logrolling, riding should be eliminated under the auspices of the
single subject rule. As with logrolls, riders can be socially beneficial or harmful, and
courts cannot reliably distinguish one from the other. The solution to this problem is to
adopt a presumption for or against riders and apply it consistently. I will argue that
riding tends to be deleterious, and the presumption against it in single subject
jurisprudence is appropriate.

6

To operationalize these concepts, I will develop a test that enables judges to
distinguish logrolling from riding. In brief, the test instructs judges to parse a statute
challenged on single subject grounds into its “functionally related” components. Courts
must then ask the following question about each component: assuming all legislators
adhere to their promises, if this component were removed and voted upon separately,
would it receive majority support? If the answer is no, the component is a rider, and the
bill violates the single subject rule. The basic insight is that independently popular
measures and logrolls always command majority support. Therefore, they will always
pass the test. Riders, on the other hand, never command majority support and will fail.
The test further requires courts to consider whether the bill’s title captures all of
the issues that it touches upon. These considerations are captured by the following
definition of a single subject: A bill can be said to embrace but one subject when all of
its provisions command majority support due to their individual merits or legislative
bargaining and the title gives notice of the bill’s contents.
This analysis sheds new light on the purposes of the single subject rule and
provides a clearer framework for approaching single subject disputes. This could
significantly enhance the consistency and effectiveness of single subject adjudication,
which could in turn improve the quality of the legislative process and its outcomes.
Granted, the test does not eliminate judicial discretion. Because courts lack perfect
information about legislators’ preferences, applying the test will still require some
guesswork. But as I will explain, courts can glean enough information in most cases to
make educated guesses. In any event, application of the test will not yield results that are
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more damaging and lesspredictable than what current single subject jurisprudence
delivers.
In addition to lending structure to the single subject rule, this paper makes a
separate contribution by developing an analytical distinction between logrolling and
riding. Both processes are used to ensure passage of provisions that do not command
majority support on their own merits. But whereas logrolling involves bargaining and
compromise, riding stems from manipulations of the legislative process. The former
always makes a majority of legislators better off, while the latter always makes a majority
worse off. Existing analyses treat logrolling and riding as closely related or identical
processes,30 which is incorrect. This observation should be of interest to judges, legal
scholars, and students of the legislative process more generally. It also supports calls for
the adoption of a single subject rule or other anti-rider device in the U.S. Congress.31
The paper will proceed in several steps. Part I reviews the rule’s history and
includes a discussion of its traditional purposes. It also presents empirical data on the
rates of single subject adjudication over time and across states. Part II discusses courts’
application of the rule. Courts apply a number of abstract and ineffective tests for

30

See, e.g., Ruud, supra note 2, at 391 (riding “seems to be but a variation of logrolling”); Michael W.
Catalano, The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian Logrolling, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST.
CONST. L. 77, 79 (1990) (referring to riding as a “variation” of logrolling); see also ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, &
GARRETT, supra note 16, at 170-74 (discussing logrolling in the context of the single subject rule but not
riding); MUELLER, supra note 26 (presenting extensive analyses of logrolling but not riding). But see
Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 958-63 (noting that logrolling moves a majority up its scale of preferences
while riding moves a majority down its scale of preferences). As far as I can tell, Lowenstein is the only
one who has recognized this distinction. I develop and expand this idea in Part III. Specifically, I show
that logrolling results from exchange while riding results from manipulations of procedure. I also explain
the circumstances under which riding can take place in legislatures (Lowenstein only analyzed the initiative
process); I examine the welfare effects of riding; and I explore the incentives that riding can create for
legislators. Finally, I reach a different conclusion from Lowenstein with respect to the implications of
riding for single subject adjudication, and I articulate a test for distinguishing riders from logrolls.
31
See, e.g., Denning & Smith, supra note 10 (calling for a single subject rule in Congress); Figinski, supra
note 16, at 390-94 (bemoaning misbehaviors in Congress that would be forbidden under the single subject
rule).
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determining whether a bill comprises more than one subject. Part III reexamines the
purposes of the rule in light of public choice theory. The distinction between logrolling
and riders is developed here. Part IV incorporates these insights and lays out a new
approach for the resolution of single subject disputes.
Before continuing, I want to emphasize two points. First, this paper is concerned
with the application of single subject rules to acts passed by state legislatures, not
initiatives or other plebiscites. Some of the discussion in Part I applies to both contexts,
but my analysis and recommendations in the rest of the paper are limited to the legislative
scenario.32 Second, this paper is intended to operate on two levels. On one level, I am
advocating significant reform—if not to the text of constitutions, at least to their
interpretation. Adopting my test would require courts to depart radically from traditional
single subject jurisprudence. On a second, more modest level, I am simply trying to shed
new light on the purposes and implications of the single subject rule. The analysis may
aid courts in their deliberations irrespective of whether they adopt my proposal.

I. BACKGROUND ON

THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE

A. A Sketch of the Rule’s History
The single subject rule can be traced to ancient Rome, where crafty lawmakers
learned to carry an unpopular provision by “harnessing it up with one more favored.”33
To prevent this nefarious practice, the Romans in 98 B.C. forbade laws consisting of

32

The application of single subject rules to initiatives and referenda is addressed in a work-in-progress. See
Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, Chaos, Riders, and Direct Democracy: The Case for a Robust
Single Subject Rule (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
33
ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 548 (1922).
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unrelated provisions.34 Similar legislative misbehavior plagued colonial America. In
1695, the Committee of the Privy Council complained that diverse acts in Massachusetts
were “joined together under ye same title,” making it impossible to vacate unpopular
provisions without also invalidating favorable ones.35 In 1702, Queen Anne tried to
check this practice, instructing Lord Cornbury of New Jersey to avoid “intermixing in
one and the same Act[ ] such things as have no proper relation to one another.”36
In 1818, a single subject requirement for bills pertaining to government salaries
materialized in the Illinois Constitution.37 The first general single subject rule appeared
in New Jersey in 1844, followed by Louisiana and Texas in 1845, and New York in
1846.38 By the end of the 20th century, the rule had been adopted in forty-two states.39
The provision in the Nebraska constitution is typical: “No bill shall contain more than
one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in the title.”40
As this quotation suggests, single subject rules almost universally include a title
provision.41 This requirement has independent historical roots, making its inaugural
appearance in the Georgia Constitution after the 1795 “Yazoo Land Fraud.”42 Members

34

Id.
See id. at 549 (citing E. I. MILLER, THE LEGISLATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF VIRGINIA 111 (1908))
(internal quotations omitted).
36
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 75 (1990) (internal
citation omitted). Very similar language was enshrined in New Jersey’s constitution in 1844. See N.J.
CONST. art. IV, § 7, p. 4 (“To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the
same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one subject ….).
37
See Ruud, supra note 2, at 389.
38
See Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at app. A.
39
See id.; Dragich, supra note 10, at app. I. The single subject rule in Arkansas only applies to
appropriations bills. The eight states without any single subject rule are Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont. This
information is presented again in Figure 2 in Part I.C.
40
NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14.
41
Of the 42 states with some form of single subject rule, 39 also have a title provision. Arkansas, Illinois,
and Indiana do not. One state, Mississippi, has a title requirement but no single subject provision. See
Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at app. A.
42
See id. at 966.
35
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of the Georgia legislature passed a bill—titled “An Act for the Payment of the late State
Troops”43—that transferred vast tracts of public land to private companies.44 Many
politicians profited from the act,45 which was “smuggled through the legislature under an
innocent and deceptive title.”46 Thereafter, Georgians demanded that each bill contain a
title that adequately expressed its contents, and a provision to that effect was added to the
constitution in 1798.47 Many other states adopted similar provisions.48

B. The Traditional Purposes of the Rule
Judicial discussions of the subject and title requirements often fail to identify their
respective purposes.49 Indeed, the rationales for the rules are usually combined:
The object of [the subject and title] provisions is summarized in the New Jersey
provision itself: “To avoid improper influences which may result from
intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each
other.” Other states cited omnibus bills that roll wide varieties of legislation into
one act, logrolling, hodgepodge legislation, bills with low visibility and deceptive
wording that skulk through the legislative process, and eleventh hour
consideration of legislation as examples of the mischief that the single subject
provisions were intended to halt.50
From this checklist of apparently nefarious practices, three principal purposes of the
single subject and title requirements can be distilled: (1) to prevent logrolling,
43

LUCE, supra note 33, at 546.
See Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at 966.
45
Id.
46
See Ruud, supra note 2, at 392.
47
See id.
48
See supra note 41.
49
See Ruud, supra note 2, at 392.
50
Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at 967 (internal citations omitted).
44
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(2) to prevent riding, and (3) to improve political transparency, both for citizens and their
representatives. A fourth purpose, (4) to protect governors’ veto power, has been
developed in case law and bears mentioning.51
These purposes will be described in turn, as will the rationale for adopting a
single subject rule to accomplish them.

1. Logrolling is the Principal Evil that Single Subject Rules Seek to Check
In his seminal examination of single subject provisions, Ruud stated that the
“primary and universally recognized purpose of the one-subject rule is to prevent
logrolling.”52 Logrolling occurs when separate propositions, at least some of which
command minority support, are combined into one bill that commands majority
support.53 The situation could run as follows. Propositions A, B, and C are unpopular;
each favors a special interest and is supported byseparate blocs ofpoliticians , each of
which comprises twenty percent of the legislature. Standing alone, none of these
provisions could become law. When combined into a single bill, however, the
propositions could garner the support of sixty percent of the legislature.54 Although
neither A nor B nor C has majority backing, all three become law.

51

See, e.g., Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694 (Okla. 1991); Deborah S. Bartell, Note, The Interplay
Between the Gubernatorial Veto and the One-Subject Rule in Oklahoma, 19 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 273
(1994); Jeffrey Gray Knowles, Note, Enforcing the One-Subject Rule: The Case for a Subject Veto, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 563 (1987).
52
Ruud, supra note 2, at 391. For opinions that cite eliminating logrolling as the main purpose of the single
subject rule, see, e.g., Heggs v. Florida, 759 So.2d 630, 627 (Fla. 2000); Johnson, 819 P.2d at 697;
Litchfield Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Babbitt, 608 P.2d 792, 800-01 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
53
See Ruud, supra note 2, at 391; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (7th ed. 1999). But see supra
note 27 (noting that logrolling can take place among provisions that have majority support).
54
This illustration assumes that the legislators who favor A are not so opposed to B and C that they would
vote against a bill that rolls all three proposals into one. The same assumption applies to legislators
favoring B and C, respectively. I also assume that propositions A, B, and C are not complementary such
that when combined their substance is different or of greater value than when separated (e.g., a spending
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In this situation, the legislators have effectively traded votes.55 In combining the
propositions, those who support A have agreed—tacitly or explicitly—to vote for B and
C so long as those supporting B and C vote for A. Vote trading of this sort need not take
place in a single, combined bill. Supporters of B and C could agree to vote for A as a
stand-alone measure as long as A’s supporters vote for B and C when the time comes. Of
course, vote trading across multiple bills is less likely to succeed. The second bill may
never be brought to a vote, or A’s supporters may decide to defect once their program has
been enacted.56 Thus, legislators have an incentive to logroll their favored provisions
into a single bill.
As this discussion suggests, courts fear logrolling because it threatens to give
legal force to proposals that individually command only minority support. Thus,
logrolling has been described as a “perversion of majority rule”57 that is “pernicious”58
and akin to “stealth and fraud in legislation.”59 A second complaint about logrolling is
that it requires legislators to decide on two or more issues with one vote. As the Supreme
Court of Florida put it, logrolling can force legislators to accept a “repugnant provision in
order to achieve adoption of a desired one.”60
The single subject rule attempts to check logrolling by forbidding unnatural
combinations of proposals in acts. The theory is that unrelated combinations could only
measure and a tax measure, both of which look irresponsible if proposed alone but which look sensible if
proposed together).
55
See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2000) (noting that logrolling is
“functionally equivalent to vote buying”).
56
See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 16, at 170. Rational legislators who engage in repeated
interactions with one another would have an incentive to avoid this behavior, as defection now could lead
to retaliation later on.
57
Ruud, supra note 2, at 399.
58
Burrell v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n, 536 So.2d 848, 865 (Miss. 1988) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
59
State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste, 464 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ohio 1984).
60
Lewis, 416 So.2d at 459. The same language could be used to describe the problem with legislative
riders. See infra Part I.B.2.
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be the product of logrolling.61 At least one commentator believes the rule has been
ineffective. In a colorful attack, Justice Yetka of the Minnesota Supreme Court referred
to logrolling as a “worm” that was “merely vexatious in the 19th century” but has become
a “monster eating the constitution in the 20th.”62

2. Preventing Riding is Another Goal of Single Subject Provisions
A second purpose of the single subject rule is to prevent riders from being
attached to “bills that are so popular … that the rider will secure adoption not on its own
merits, but on the merits of the measure to which it is attached.”63 The situation could
unfold as follows. A popular provision, A, will command 80 percent support when it is
brought to a general vote. Recognizing this fact, the committee proposingthe bill attaches
to it an unpopular rider, B, which favors special interests. The combined bill, AB, is then
submitted to the floor of the legislature. Depending on the rules of procedure, the full
legislature may not be able to amend the bill.64 Or even if they could amend the bill,
legislators may choose not to because other important bills are in the queue, making the
opportunity costs of haggling too high. Thus, despite B’s unpopularity, the bill passes,
possibly with much less than 80 percent of the vote.
Riding is often conceptualized as a special type of logrolling.65 Insofar as both
logrolling and riding require legislators to decide two or more issues with just one vote,
this comparison is apt. However, the processes that give rise to logrolling and riding are
61

See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1098 (Ohio 1999)
(“The one-subject provision attacks logrolling by disallowing unnatural combinations of provisions in acts
… on the theory that the best explanation for the unnatural combination is a tactical one—logrolling.”).
62
Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d at 784 (Yetka, J., concurring).
63
Ruud, supra note 2, at 391.
64
See infra Part III.B.
65
See supra note 30.
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different. As discussed, logrolling results from legislative bargaining. Minority blocs
agree, directly or implicitly, to vote for one another’s proposals in exchange for support
on the issues each holds most dear. Riding, on the other hand, does not result from
legislative bargains but rather manipulations of committee power and the procedural
rules. The “sponsor of a rider only [has] to convince a few members of a committee or
even the chairman of a committee to add the rider[,] and then it [can] ride through the
legislative process on a popular bill.”66 Part III explores this distinction in depth.
Notwithstanding these different processes, judges find the results of riding and
logrolling equally undesirable. “[E]ngrafting, upon subjects of great public benefit and
importance, for local or selfish purposes, foreign and often pernicious matters” forces
legislators to vote for provisions which, if “offered as independent subjects, would never
have received [majority] support.”67
The single subject rule attempts to curb riding by striking down bills thatcontain
multiple subjects. The theory is that at least one provision in a multi-subject bill
represents a rider.68

3. Single Subject Requirements Aim to Improve Political Transparency
A third purpose of the single subject rule is to simplify the lawmaking process,
allowing both legislators and citizens to fully comprehend the intentions and
ramifications of legislation. For legislators, limiting bills to one subject should enable

66

Catalano, supra note 30, at 79. I explore this issue much more thoroughly in Part III.B.
Porten Sullivan Corp., 568 A.2d at 1117-18.
68
Cf. id.
67
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them to scrutinize proposals without being distracted by extraneous matters.69 For
citizens, limiting the scope of bills ensures that the public is afforded reasonable notice of
the contents of legislation.70
The title requirement embedded in most single subject rules plays a prominent
role in enhancing transparency.71 “The notion that members of … state legislatures sit
down and read, much less reread the text of the bills on which they vote is plainly
erroneous….”72 Similarly, voters tend not to seek out much information on proposals
that may become law.73 Legislators and citizens may, however, at least read the titles of
bills. Ensuring that titles accurately reflect the content of bills should help prevent
unwanted laws from slipping through the legislature.74
The title provision plays an important but less direct role in assisting courts to
identify logrolling and riding. For example, the use of an excessivelygeneral title
suggests that the bill embraces multiple subjects and may be the product of logrolling.75

4. Single Subject Rules Can Be Used to Protect the Gubernatorial Veto Power
A final and still-emerging purpose of the single subject rule is to prevent
legislatures from eroding governors’ veto power.76 Logrolling disparate provisions into

69

See Ruud, supra note 2, at 391; see also, e.g., Wass v. Anderson, 252 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Minn. 1977)
(citing State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312, 322 (1875)) (limiting bills to a single subject allows legislators to
“secure to every distinct measure of legislation a separate consideration and decision”).
70
See Harbor v. Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1300 (Cal. 1987).
71
See Ruud, supra note 2, at 392 (“The primary purpose of the title requirement is to prevent surprise and
fraud upon the people and the legislature.”).
72
Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 46.
73
See id.
74
See Turnbull, 668 A.2d at 1383.
75
Cf. Carl H. Manson, The Drafting of Statute Titles, 10 IND. L.J. 155, 162 (1934-35) (“Surplusage of body
is present [when the body of a statute contains] material which is not expressed in the title and which is not
germane to the other body material …. If the body contains two objects and the title contains only one of
them, without question the one not expressed in the title is invalid”).
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one bill can force a governor to choose between enacting some provisions she dislikes
and vetoing the entire bill, including components she favors.77 Similarly, attaching a
rider to an otherwise popular bill can effectively “veto-proof[ ]” that rider.78 The
relationship between the single subject rule and the veto was not explicitly recognized in
early commentary. Nevertheless, “it cannot be denied that … the broader the definition
ascribed to the term ‘one subject’ … the more circumscribed is the Governor's power to
veto legislation.”79
Forty-three state governors can exercise a line-item veto,80 and this permits
removal of some logrolled provisions and riders. But in 42 of these states, the line-item
authority is limited to appropriations bills.81 Thus, there are substantial swaths of
legislation that are vulnerable to these problems.
By limiting the scope of bills, the single subject rule allows governors to exercise
their veto power with respect to each general provision that receives majority support in
the legislature. This not only discourages logrolling and riding but also appears to boost
governors’ power by giving them more opportunities to exercise their authority. I will
challenge this latter assertion in Part III.

76

See Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition v. Ortiz, 2005 WL 774457 at *1 (Colo. App. 2005)
(noting that one of the purposes of the rule is “to enable the governor to consider each single subject of
legislation separately in determining whether to exercise the veto power”).
77
See Knowles, supra note 51, at 567-58.
78
See id.
79
Harbor v. Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1299 (Cal. 1987).
80
See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1175-76. Of these 43, 40 have a single subject rule; only Indiana and
Nevada have a single subject rule but no line-item veto.
81
Only Washington grants its governor a line-item veto applicable to all legislation. See id.
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C. The Rates of Single Subject Adjudication
Having discussed the history and purposes of the single subject rule, I will now
consider the frequency with which it is invoked. Most scholars who have addressed the
rule believe it is a source of much litigation. Ruud, for example, stated that courts have
been called on to resolve single subject disputes in “literally hundreds of cases.”82 Forty
years earlier, Dodd made a more precise and astonishing assertion, claiming that state
statutes had been struck down on single subject grounds more than 450 times.83 In 1912,
Lapp stated that “[n]o question is raised so often in court as this one: Does the law have
more than one subject and is that expressed in the title?”84 Unfortunately, these scholars
did not provide support their claims.
Obtaining a record of single subject adjudication would be valuable in several
regards. For one, it would indicate whether litigation rates are as high as these scholars
claim. Indeed, my reexamination of the single subject rule is unmerited if the rule is
never used. More generally, such a record would illuminate a portion of the legal
landscape and offer clues about the dynamic relationship between the legislative and
judicial branches.
I have compiled such a record. Incorporating the states’ varying constitutional
language, I devised a Westlaw search that I believe captures the vast majority of cases
involving single subject issues.85 I then ran that search for every state with a single
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Ruud, supra note 2, at 403.
W. F. Dodd, The Problem of State Constitutional Construction, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 635, 640 (1920).
84
John A. Lapp, The Initiative, Referendum and Recall, 43 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 49, 60 (1912).
85
I structured the general search as follows: ("single subject" or "single object" or "one subject" or "one
object" +1 rule or requirement or provision or clause or limitation or doctrine) or "title-object clause" or
(embrac! or relat! or refer! or contain! or confin!) /5 ("single subject" or "single object" or "one subject" or
"one object"). I then tailored the search to each state by deleting all roots in the italicized phrase except for
83
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subject rule and recorded the number of hits. The results are presented in Figures 1
and 2.

Figure 1: Single Subject Litigation Over Time
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These results provide only rough estimates. Courts may settle some single subject
disputes without using the characteristic language that the search is designed to identify.
In that regard, the search is underinclusive. Moreover, the search is capturing cases in
which single subject arguments were raised by the litigants but not actually ruled upon by
the court. It also returns cases in which the relevant constitutional language was cited but
the single subject rule was not actually at issue. Finally, the search is double counting
single subject disputes that were litigated in front of both an appellate court and a state
supreme court. From these standpoints, the search is overinclusive. Note also that it is
identifying single subject cases involving regular legislation as well as plebiscites.

the one(s) that appear in that state’s constitution. In some states, the constitutional language of the single
subject rule has changed over time. I adjusted the searches accordingly.
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Notwithstanding the roughness of the figures,86 early assertions about the
frequency of single subject litigation appear to be accurate. By my count, 8,097 cases87
have been litigated since New Jersey first adopted the rule. The litigation rates have
varied dramatically over time. In the period from 1910 to 1919, during which 40 states
had single subject rules in place,88 over 800 cases were tried. In the 1960s, during which
all 42 single subject rules were in place,89 fewer than 300 cases were tried. During the
five years from 2000 to 2004, an astonishing 861 caseswere litigated. If that trend
continues, more single subject cases will be tried between 2000 and 2009 than in the
previous three decades combined.
In addition to varying over time, the frequency of single subject adjudication
diverges across states. Courts in Nebraska have resolved 201 single subject disputes,
while their neighbors in South Dakota have addressed only 79. Virginia courts have
adjudicated 60 cases, while Kentucky courts have resolved 198. In Missouri, 329 single
subject challenges have been raised in court. In Florida, the figure is 891. Figure 2
presents the total number of single subject cases that have been adjudicated in each state.
It also lists the year in which each state adopted the rule.90

86

To test the accuracy of my search, I read all of the cases that it returned (through February 2004) for
three states: Nevada, South Carolina, and Utah. Across those states, the search returned 248 cases. In
most of those, the single subject rule was, in fact, at issue. In 210 of them, the court ruled on the single
subject question. The success rate for single subject challenges was 22% in Nevada, 14% in South
Carolina, and 7% in Utah.
87
Not all of these are cases in the technical sense. Some are advisory opinions issued in response to
questions posed by state officials regarding the constitutionality of a proposed law. See, e.g., Advisory
Opinion to the Attorney General Re the Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment, 880
So.2d 675 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam).
88
Thirty eight states adopted the single subject rule before 1910. New Mexico and Arizona adopted their
rules in 1911 and 1912, respectively. Alaska and Hawaii adopted the rule in 1959. See infra Figure 2.
89
See id.
90
This information is drawn from Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at 1024.

20

I leave the exploration of litigation trends for another day.91 For present purposes,
it is sufficient to point out that single subject litigation is, in fact, frequent. Courts are
often called upon to determine whether a given bill or plebiscite violates the rule. In
recent years, single subject litigation has blossomed. Between 2000 and 2004, an average
of three single subject cases were adjudicated nationwide every week. That is equal to
almost one case every two days. This flurry of activitymakes a reexamination of the rule
especially timely.

91

I would, however, like to offer the following tentative and untested hypothesis: litigation rates are
associated with success rates and ambiguity in the legal doctrine. Relatively high success rates and
ambiguous judicial opinions in a given decade made potential litigants more optimistic and raised the
number of cases in the subsequent decade. Conversely, relatively low success rates and clear opinions
made litigants more pessimistic and reduced the number of subsequent challenges.
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II. APPLYING THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
While Part I provided a macro overview of the single subject rule, including its
history, purposes, and rates of litigation, this Part takes a micro approach, digging into the
cases and exploring courts’ approaches to single subject disputes. I have three objectives:
to describe the processes by which courts adjudicate single subject disputes; to illustrate
the uncertainty that characterizes those processes; and to argue thatthe single subject rule
and the jurisprudence that surrounds it are flawed.
I will first discuss judicial deference and the appropriations exception; in many
states, appropriations bills are exempted from the single subject requirement. I will then
review courts’ efforts to identify a framework for approaching single subject disputes.
Defining a single subject is a constant challenge, and courts have developed rough and
ineffective tests for doing so. Next, I will cover severability, the notion that courts can,
upon finding a violation of the single subject rule, sever just the offending provision and
uphold the rest of the act.92 I will then review three cases that illustratethe uncertainties
in this area of the law. This Part concludes by summarizing the state of single subject
jurisprudence and exposing the limitations inherent in the rule.

A. Judicial Deference and the Appropriations Exception
Judges tend to shy away from invalidating laws. In the words of an Arizona
court, “[n]o task … is more grave than passing upon the constitutionality of
legislation.”93 Thus, it comes as no surprise that courts adopt—or at least pretend to
adopt—a cautious stance in single subject disputes, interpreting the rule liberally and

92
93

See Ruud, supra note 2, at 399-00.
Babbitt, 608 P.2d at 800.
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resolving all doubts in favor of the legislature.94 In Iowa, legislative acts only are
invalidated when they “clearly, plainly and palpably” violate the single subject rule.95 In
South Dakota, “the conflict between the statute and the constitution must be plain and
manifest” before a law will be struck down on single subject grounds.96 For over a
century, Ohio’s single subject rule was merely directory, not mandatory.97
Consistent with a deferential approach, courts often grant legislatures greater
leeway when enacting appropriations bills. This is due to the fear of treading on an
important part of the legislative process and also the recognition that the very “purpose of
appropriations bills is to allocate monies for … multitudinous and disparate needs.”98 In
Illinois, for example, the state constitution specifically excludes appropriations bills from
the single subject requirement.99 Other state constitutions contain no such exception, but
judges still afford appropriations bills more flexibility.100
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See, e.g., Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207, 214 (Ind. 1981).
Iowa v. Social Hygiene, Inc., 156 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Iowa 1968).
96
Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 767 (S.D. 1985).
97
Compare Dix, 464 N.E.2d at 156 (stating that a “long line of unbroken cases” hold that Ohio’s single
subject rules are “directory rather than mandatory”) with Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 215
(Ohio 1999) (“Despite the ‘directory’ language of Dix, the recent decisions of this court make it clear that
we no longer view the one-subject rule as toothless.”).
98
Flanders v. Morris, 558 P.2d 769, 773 (Wash. 1977).
99
IL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d) (“Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or
rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject. Appropriation bills shall be limited to the subject
of appropriations.”).
100
Compare, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. III (containing no exception to the single subject rule for
appropriations bills) with Flanders, 558 P.2d at 773 (“Clearly, greater latitude must be afforded the
[Washington] legislature in enacting multisubject legislation under the appropriations bill….”). Some
courts will invalidate appropriations acts if logrolling or riding is obvious. For example, if a provision in
an appropriations bill is unrelated to state spending, the legislation may be declared invalid. See Lewis, 416
So.2d at 460.
Exempting appropriations bills from single subject challenges is problematic. Doing so
encourages legislators to attach self-serving riders to appropriations measures—they need not fear judicial
oversight, and because appropriations bills are often urgent, there is little risk that riders will be amended
out. In addition, the exception may undermine the application of the single subject rule to most other
legislation. The logrolling that legislators are forbidden from engaging in when bills are proposed gets
transferred to the appropriations process. Rather than bargaining over the passage of acts, legislators
bargain over whether to fund them. Under the approach to single subject adjudication laid out in Part IV,
appropriations bills could be treated the same as all other legislation.
95
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Although courts prefer not to enforce the single subject rule, they cannot ignore
constitutional mandates. As a Maryland court expressed, “[d]espite this ‘general
disposition’ of deference … the ‘single-subject’ provision is still a part of our
constitution.”101 When single subject disputes arise, judges must formulate tests for
determining whether the legislation at issue violates the rule.

B. Defining a Single Subject: The Fumble for a Test
To resolve single subject disputes, courts need only define the term “subject” and
then decide if the legislation at issue contains more than one. At first blush, this may
seem like a simple exercise. The constitutional language is clear,102 and “subject” is a
common term, not a legalism. But in the law, the commonality of a term is less important
than its plasticity. What constitutes a “subject” is inherently elusive, leading courts away
from dictionaries and towards the fabrication of tests for measuring compliance with the
single subject rule. These tests are exceptionally broad and fail to provide judges or
litigants with much guidance.

1. “Subject” Cannot Be Objectively Defined
In his classic treatment of single subject rules, Ruud recognized the difficulty of
defining a subject, noting that “[s]ubjects are organized and classified as such in the law
for a variety of reasons—for reasons of history, legal theory, convenience, functional
relationships and the like.”103 Several years later, Lowenstein put it more bluntly: “a
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Porten Sullivan Corp., 568 A.2d at 1118.
See, e.g., supra note 2.
103
Ruud, supra note 2, at 411. Ruud was not the first commentator to identify this difficulty. See Manson,
supra note 75, at 159-60 (“The identification of the object of the statute is the most difficult problem raised
102

25

subject is in the eye of the beholder.”104 Topics or themes cannot objectively be classified
into one subject or another.105 This is because subjects are defined not by logic but by
social context.106 To illustrate using some of Lowenstein’s examples, the terms “torts,”
“biology,” “medicine,” and “surgery” probably fall under the subject of “university
education.”107 Most people, however, would not place all of them under the subjects
“legal education,” “medical education,” or “science.”108 Thus, the context in which ideas
are combined is essential in understanding whether they relate to the same subject.109 To
confound the issue, context can be interpreted differently. One doctor might argue that all
four of Lowenstein’s terms fall under the subject “medical profession.” Another might
counter that only the last three terms are pertinent, and a third, cynical doctor might insist
that only the first term matters!
The point is that subjects are, as the word itselfimplies, subjective. No matter
how disparate they seem, judges cannot study the provisions of an act and declare with
any confidence that they embrace more than one subject. To do so would require a
transcript of the thoughts of every legislator who voted for the bill.
Some courts have refused to acknowledge this stumbling block. Consider, for
example, the following passage quoted by the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1980:
[T]he title to an act may include more than one subject, provided all can be so
united and combined as to form only one single, entire, but more extended
subject; yet, neither the title to the act nor the act itself can contain more than one
by the title-body clause. . . . There are objects upon objects. . . . There will always be differences of
opinion as to what is the object of a statute.”).
104
Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 938.
105
See id. at 938-39.
106
See id.
107
See id. at 940-42.
108
See id.
109
See id. This point was made more explicitly in Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 47.
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subject, unless all the subjects which it contains can be so united and combined as
to form only one single subject.110
This represents a formal, doctrinal, and utterly hopeless attempt to reason around the
problem.
Fortunately, many courts avoid such tautologies. The Supreme Court of Indiana
summarized the issue nicely: “For purposes of legislation, ‘subjects’ are not absolute
existences to be discovered by some sort of a priori reasoning, but are the result of
classification for convenience … and for greater effectiveness in obtaining the general
purpose of the … act.”111 The understanding reflected in this quote has led courts away
from attempts to define “subject” and towards the development of more flexible tests.

2. Courts Have Formulated a Variety of Tests for Determining Compliance with
the Single Subject Rule
Courtshave fabricated a number of tests that seek to guard against the abuses the
single subject rule was meant to prevent without obstructing important legislation.112 The
language of the tests is terse and varies across jurisdictions. Indiana courts ask whether
there is a “reasonable basis” for grouping together the disparate parts of a bill.113 In
Illinois, provisions must have a “natural and logical connection” to be considered one
subject.114 Oregon courts look for a “unifying principle logically connecting all
provisions in the act.”115 The Minnesota legislature must demonstrate that proposals are
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Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Thiessen, 612 P.2d 172, 178-79 (Kan. 1980) (quoting Kansas v. Barrett, 27
Kan. 213 (1882)).
111
Dague, 418 N.E.2d at 214 (quoting Indiana ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, 180 N.E. 865, 868 (Ind. 1932)).
112
See, e.g., Stephan, 612 P.2d at 178.
113
Dague, 418 N.E.2d at 214.
114
Johnson, 680 N.E.2d at 1379.
115
McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 856 (Ore. 1996).
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either related “logically or in popular understanding” or are “germane” to one subject.116
This germaneness standard is popular; Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Kansas also follow
it, just to name a few.117
While the language of the tests differs, their purpose is the same: to identify bills
that, based on a commonsense interpretation of context, containprovisions that are
unrelated to one another. The theory is that such bills are the product of logrolling or
riding and should be struck down.118 Many courts use these same tests to determine
whether a disputed act is too confusing,119 another occurrence that the single subject
rule—and the title provision in particular—seeks to prevent . The rationale is that
disparate measures cannot be simultaneously enacted in a manner that is comprehensible
to citizens and their representatives.120 Other courts use a separate analysis to decide
whether an act is too confusing or opaque.121 This approach parses the single subject rule
into its “subject” and “title” requirements.122
Regardless of how courts structure their analyses, they face the same challenge of
assessing whether the context in which an act was passed justifies the combination of the
proposals at issue. Unfortunately, they often fail to disclose the ultimate basis for their
decisions.
116

Carlson, 590 N.W.2d at 136.
See DeWeese v. Weaver, 824 A.2d 364, 370 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); Porten Sullivan Corp., 568 A.2d
at 1120; Stephan, 612 P.2d at 179.
118
See supra text accompanying notes 61 and 68.
119
See, e.g., Bernstein v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 351 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the
purpose of the single subject rule is to prevent voter confusion and applying a germaneness test).
120
Cf. DeWeese, 824 A.2d at 369 (“[A] bill addressing a single topic is deemed more likely to obtain a
considered review than one addressing many.”).
121
See, e.g., Motor Club of Iowa v. Dep’t of Trans., 265 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1978) (stating that the issue is
not whether the act contains unrelated provisions but whether its title is sufficient to prevent surprise in
legislation, which is a separate component of the single subject rule).
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Many courts collapse the subject and title components of the single subject rule into one analysis. See
Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at 994. Other courts, however, insist that the two components should be
examined separately. See, e.g., Harbor, 742 P.2d at 1300. Whether one approach uncovers more single
subject violations than the other is unclear.
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Many courts that uphold diverse legislation as long as the subjects contained in a
particular bill are “reasonably germane” … or as long as the court can discern a
“rational unity” among them, do so without unpacking or defining those phrases.
Indeed, the opinions often convey a sense of the judicial unwillingness to develop
a meaningful standard for challenges to legislation…. Though it is overstated,
there is some truth to … [the] observation that no criteria for subject-title
requirements has [sic] been developed by judicial action.123
The tests courts have developed for coping with single subject disputes may
represent an improvement over any effort to define “subject.” But they are far from
precise, leaving judges with little guidance and much discretion. On the one hand, that
discretion offers valuable flexibility in dealing with the sensitive issue of statutory
review. But on the other hand, discretion opens the door for inconsistency and “personal
prejudices and political and subjective considerations by the court. . . .”124 In my view,
the discretion is harmful. Courts are not using vague tests in order to judiciously and
selectively enforce the single subject rule. They use such tests because no one has
developed a more sensible and concrete approach to the problem.

C. Single Subject Violations and Severability
Before examining some representative cases, it is worth discussing the actions
courts take upon finding single subject violations. Many courts declare legislation that
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Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at 995-96 (internal quotations omitted).
See Manson, supra note 75, at 159.
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embraces multiple subjects void in its entirety.125 Other courts, however, seek to sever
and strike down only those provisions that offend the single subject rule, upholding the
rest.126 In some states, limited judicial severing is authorized by the constitution. The
Arizona constitution, for example, explicitly allows judges to sever any provision from an
act that is not properly expressed in the act’s title.127 In other states, courts have inferred
the power to sever acts that violate the rule.128
The general rationale for severing is that it represents a “far less disruptive”
course of action than does complete nullification.129 This may be especially true when
legislative riders are present. Rather than striking down the entire bill—all of which,
with the exception of the rider, was supported by a legislative majority—severing allows
the court to extract the rider and let the popular provisions stand.130 Furthermore, there is
a “strong presumption” that legislatures prefer severance to invalidation.131 Thus, by
severing provisions, courts are merely carrying out legislative intent.132
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See, e.g., Babbitt, 608 P.2d at 804 (declaring that severing “injects the courts more deeply than they
should be into the legislative process”); see also Ruud, supra note 2, at 399 (stating that when multiple
subjects are included in a single act, courts generally invalidate that act in its entirety).
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See, e.g., Simpson, 367 N.W.2d at 768 (“Unconstitutional provisions of a statute may be extracted and
the remainder left intact.”).
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See ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 13 (“[I]f any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be
expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the
title.”). This peculiar wording implies that bills can contain multiple subjects so long as they are all
expressed in the title. Yet such a construction runs contrary to the preceding clause in the Arizona
constitution, “Every Act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith.” Id.
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Of course, the danger of severing is that courts may make mistakes. Identifying
riders is challenging.133 And when the issue is not riding but logrolling and the bill
contains multiple subjects, courts must determine which subject is “dominant” or of
“greater dignity.”134 This can lead to arbitrary decision-making. Nevertheless, a number
of courts in recent years have severed acts that were deemed to violate the single subject
rule.135

D. Canned Worms: A Glance at Single Subject Cases
Having generalized about courts’ approaches to single subject adjudication, it will
be instructive to review some actual cases. As these cases illustrate, judges do not always
recognize all of the purposes of the rule. Due to the rule’s ambiguity, they sometimes
struggle to explain their reasoning, relying instead on generalities. Finally, they are
uncertain how to approach the issue of severability. I would stress that while some
opinions are more cogent than the ones I present here, these are not unrepresentative.

1. Some Courts Lack a Clear Understanding of theRule’s Purposes and
Struggle with the Title Requirement
In 1994, the Oklahoma legislature passed Senate Bill (“S.B.”) 1121, which
adjusted the state income tax for nonresidents and part-time residents.136 Governor
Walters vetoed the bill, but the legislature overrode his veto and enacted the law.137 In
response, the governor and Ken Feagins, a nonresident whose tax burden increased as a
133
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result of the bill, filed a lawsuit.138 Among other arguments, they claimed that S.B. 1121
violated the single subject rule.139 They lost at the trial level and filed an appeal.140
The appellate court began its deliberations by reciting the purposes of the single
subject rule. First, the court noted that the rule prevents “logrolling—the enactment of
legislation through the combination of unpopular causes with popular legislation.”141
Typically, attaching disfavored provisions to popular bills is referred to as riding, not
logrolling, but for the time being this is a semantic point. These two processes generally
are not distinguished from one another. Again, I will develop a distinction between them
in Part III. Second, the court stated that the rule keeps legislators from “’veto-proofing’”
a bill by attaching a “popular rider to an otherwise unpopular bill.”142 The court did not
understand riding to be intrinsically harmful. Rather, the emphasis was on protecting the
gubernatorial veto power, which was relevant to the case but not one of the rule’s
traditional purposes. The court never acknowledged the rule’s role in improving political
transparency.143
Having reviewed the purposes of the rule, the court used the following test to
resolve the case: “If the bill’s provisions are ‘germane, relative, and cognate’ to the
subject expressed in the title, then the bill satisfies” the single subject rule.144 This
construction seems to condone the passage of bills containing multiple subjects so long as
those subjects are all reflected in the title. Indeed, even unpopular riders would appear to
survive this test so long as they are acknowledged. As discussed, the primary purpose of
138
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the title requirement is to improve transparency. A lengthy, convoluted title that
technically captures all of the components of a bill but does not provide meaningful
guidance on its contents does not satisfy this mandate, at least under the traditional single
subject formulation.
The complete title of S.B. 1121 was 742 words long and began with the phrase
“An Act relating to revenue and taxation, debtor and creditor, intoxicating liquors, motor
vehicles and soldiers and sailors.”145 Notwithstanding the breadth of the title, the court
declared that every component of the act related to the subject of “tax administration.”146
The act was upheld.

2. Resolution of Single Subject Disputes Can Be Overly Formalistic, and
Severability Can Be Rash
In February 1993, the appropriations committee of the Ohio House of
Representatives considered a four-page spending bill regarding the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation (“Bureau”).147 Under pressure from the governor, the bill gradually
morphed into a “massive” proposal to restructure the workers’ compensation system.148
It curtailed the power of the state’s Industrial Commission (“Commission”), beefed up
the authority of the Bureau, revamped the hearing and appeals procedures, changed
injured workers’ rights and access to health care, and provided funding for the new
arrangement.149 All told, it took “twenty pages to list the changes [to workers’
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compensation laws] made by the bill.”150 The Ohio legislature passed the bill, and after
exercising a line-item veto, the governor signed it.151
Three cases challenged the constitutionality of the new law, and they were
consolidated into a single case before the Ohio Supreme Court.152 One of the relators’
claims was that the bill violated the single subject rule. Specifically, the relators claimed
that the bill embraced seven subjects: appropriations for the Bureau, appropriations for
the Commission, structural changes to the Bureau, structural changes to the Commission,
changes to the substance of workers’ compensation law, the creation of an intentional
employment tort, and a child labor exemption.153
The court began by professing reluctance to interfere in the legislative process,
noting that only “manifestly gross and fraudulent” violations of the single subject rule
would lead to invalidation.154 Next, the court addressed the relators’ first claim: that the
appropriations provisions bore no relation to the rest of the bill. The court dismissed this
argument, stating that the inclusion of spending measures “simply allows the other
provisions of the bill to be implemented.”155 The court then turned to the intentional tort
provision and the child labor exemption. Here, the relators met with greater success. The
court found that both provisions violated the single subject rule.156
In an earlier, unrelated case, the court held that intentional torts in the workplace
were independent from the workers’ compensation system and the employment
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relationship.157 Thus, the intentional tort provision buried in the legislation at hand
“[could] not be related to the common purpose of the bill,” which was to amend the
workers’ compensation laws.158 This conclusion was premised on the court’s artificial
delineation of legal topics. The court never looked to the contextual reasons the
legislature may have had for packaging the measures in one bill.159 The court also
declared that the child labor exemption did not “touch upon” the laws related to workers’
compensation.160 The court used just four sentences to explain this conclusion.161
After finding that the intentional tort and child labor provisions violated the single
subject rule, the court severed them from the bill.162 No explanation of how this
procedure would further the single subject rule’s purposes was provided.163 Indeed, the
purposes of the single subject rule were not discussed anywhere in the lead opinion.164

3. Single Subject Disputes Ultimately Are Resolved By Judicial Fiat
In November 2001, the state Senate in Pennsylvania approved S.B. 1089, which
aimed to amend the DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders Act (“DNA
Act”).165 The DNA Act established a statewide databank of DNA records that was
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intended to assist law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations.166 S.B. 1089
proposed to increase the number of offenders required to submit a DNA sample to the
databank.167 The bill also limited the ability of felony sex offenders to have their DNA
records expunged.168
During the next seven months, Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives made
several changes to S.B. 1089.169 In its final form, the bill performed two functions: (1) it
revised and codified the DNA Act, which previously had been a stand-alone enactment,
as the newly-created Chapter 47 of the Judicial Code; and (2) it amended Chapter 71 of
the Judicial Code, which covered comparative negligence.170 On June 18, 2002, the
House passed S.B. 1089 with its revisions in place.171 The Senate followed suit the next
day, and the governor signed it into law.172
Shortly after the bill’s passage, two members of Pennsylvania’s legislature
challenged it under the auspices of the single subject rule.173 The court began its analysis
with an excellent review of the traditional purposes of the rule, including to check
logrolling and riding and to improve transparency.174 Next, the court stated the test it
would apply to resolve the case: “each subject in an act must be germane to the other
subjects.”175 The court then concluded that a single subject violation had occurred.176
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“We cannot say that requiring DNA samples from incarcerated felony sex offenders bears
a ‘proper relation’ to joint and several liability ….”177
In reaching this decision, the court rejected a pair of respondents’ arguments.
First, the court set aside the claim that the bill’s provisions fell under the subject of
consequences of certain criminal and civil verdicts: “The claim that [DNA samples and
negligence standards] relate to judicial procedure is a reach.”178 Second, the court
dismissed the argument that it violated its own precedent by finding a single subject
violation in the bill at hand.
In an earlier case, the court upheld a law that both adjusted taxicab regulations
and deregulated electrical utilities.179 The common theme of the law was “public utility
regulation,” and, likeS.B. 1089 , it made two changes to a single state code—in that case,
the Public Utility Code.180 The court distinguished that case from the case at bar in the
following way. Whereas theregulations bill made changes to existing provisions ofthe
Public Utility Code, the bill at issue added a new provision to the Judicial Code and
amended one chapter of it.181
This distinction seems baseless; the single subject rule is not concerned with the
organization of state codes but rather the prevention of certain legislative practices. The
real issue was whether “public utility regulation” constituted a more narrowly focused
subject—and permitted fewer legislative misbehaviors—than “consequences for certain
criminal and civil verdicts.” The court did not address that question.
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E. Summary: The State of Single Subject Jurisprudence
The single subject rule remains, even after a century-and-a-half of life, a source of
uncertainty. Not all courts recognize all of the purposes of the rule, and among the
purposes they do recognize, there is sometimes hesitancy to flesh them out. Resolution
of single subject disputes turns on vague tests that rely as much on judicial commonsense
as legal analysis. As one judge stated, it is unclear “whether characterizing the ‘one
subject’ of a measure is a usable legal test … or whether it simply compels endless
conceptual manipulation, controversy, and litigation.”182 This leads some courts to apply
the rule aggressively while others take a softer approach.183 Finally, courts diverge in
their treatment of single subject violations. Some courts mechanically strike down acts,
while others sever some provisions and let others stand. Taken together, these facts make
clear that single subject jurisprudence is unsteady. Reading the opinions of a given court
does not provide firm guidance on how that court will resolve future single subject
disputes.
These problems should not be attributed to judges but rather the wording of the
rule itself. “Subjects” are hard to define, and thus the rule’s text provides little guidance.
In addition, the text is disconnected from the purposes of the rule. The rule does not
forbid logrolling or riding; it forbids bills from containing multiple subjects.184 But there
is no reason to suppose that logrolling and riding occur only in bills addressing multiple
subjects. One could imagination legislators trading votes over several unpopular tax
breaks that are cobbled together in one bill and passed with majority support. Such
182
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logrolling would fly under the judicial radar if the provisions had an easily recognizable
theme, say, “corporate taxation.” Similarly, an unpopular rider that channels funds to a
corrupt defense contractor could probably be appended to a bill addressing “national
security.” Again, this would fall outside of the single subject rule’s purview. In these
senses, the rule is underinclusive.
The rule is underinclusive in another sense: it only captures logrolling that takes
place in a single bill.185 Among stable coalitions of legislators, logrolls can be spread
across multiple bills. Legislators could trade votes to secure passage of two measures, A
and B, that are independently unpopular. The legislators could then subject A and B to
separate votes. Assuming the legislators adhered to their promises, bills A and B would
both pass, and neither one would offend the single subject rule.
The rule is also overinclusive. Not every act that addresses multiple subjects is
the product of logrolling or riding. Legislators have incentives to package together
unrelated but independently popular provisions in a single bill. Doing so lowers
transaction costs by preventing legislators from wasting time on multiple sets of
deliberations and voting sessions when only one would suffice. This practice is valuable
when time is short and legislators have multiple issues to address. Even if this is done
with full disclosure and complete transparency, such composite acts are liable to be
struck down on single subject grounds.
In short, the single subject rule itself, not just the jurisprudence that surrounds it,
is flawed. Even if “subjects” could objectively be defined, logrolls and riders would
continue to slip through the legislative process, and genuinely popular legislation would
get struck down. It comes as no surprise that, in practice, judges occasionally make
185
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mistakes. Some missteps are unavoidable. But it does come as a surprise that even in a
world of perfect single subject adjudication, the rule would still lead to errors.
Improving single subject jurisprudence requires courts to look first to the rule’s
purposes, not the literal text of the rule. Part III is devoted to understanding those
purposes.

III. RETHINKING 19TH CENTURY JURISPRUDENCE: PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE
PURPOSES OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
While the last Part illustrated the inconsistency that characterizes single subject
adjudication, this Part bears down on the fundamental purposes uderlying the rule.
Courts often rely on historical expositions when discussing the purposes of the rule, and
many of these date from the 19th century.186 Understanding of legislative processes has
improved significantly since then, and that knowledge should be incorporated into single
subject adjudication. In this regard, the insights of public choice theory—broadly defined
as the application of economic principles to political institutions187—are instructive.
This Part revisits the purposes of the single subject rule in light of public choice.
I will show that logrolling can be considerably less malevolent then perceived, but that
riding presents a genuine and distinct threat to majority rule. Improving political
transparency is an important goal of single subject rules, but rigid application of the rule
can be counterproductive in this regard. Finally, a strict single subject rule does
strengthen governors’ veto power, but it does not necessarily augment executive authority
vis-à-vis the legislature. It curtails governors’ ability to orchestrate legislative bargains.
186
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A. The Vexatious Worm Revisited: Logrolling and Cooperative Surplus
Logrolling is tantamount to vote trading.188 To ensure that an unpopular bill
receives enough votes for passage, supporters of the bill must bargain with nonsupporters.189 Explicit vote trading occurs if the supporters convince others to vote for the
bill in exchange for their votes on a different measure. Of course, that different measure
may never reach the floor of the legislature, or the supporters may renege on their
promise.190 Thus, non-supporters often prefer to give and receive simultaneously by
adding a measure they favor to the supporter’s bill. The resulting two-part bill is a logroll,
and the vote trading is implicit. Neither side actually swaps votes but rather agrees tacitly
to endorse the bill. In this way, each party benefits from the other’s backing, receiving its
preferred provision and tolerating the other side’s measure. Logrolling in this scenario
looks suspiciously like a common and considerably less-maligned practice: legislative
compromise.191
For years, public choice scholars have argued that vote trading can benefit
legislators as well as their constituents.192 The theory begins with the recognition that, in
majority rule voting, a person who is passionately opposed to a measure and a person
188
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who is modestly favorable but essentially indifferent are given equal weight.193 If a bare
majority favors a bill, however slightly, the bill will become law, even if to an outraged
minority it represents legislative anathema. In this situation, it seems “obvious that both
[groups] could be made better off … if [those] strongly opposed should be permitted in
some way to ‘trade’ … with the relatively indifferent supporter[s] of the proposed
measure.” 194 By giving up votes on provisions in which they are uninterested and
receiving votes on provisions that they value, legislators can improve their positions.195
This improvement represents what economists call a “cooperative surplus.”
The following example will concretize this argument. Assume that a legislature
has just three members, and they are choosing among three policies, A, B, and C.196
Legislator 1 passionately supports A and mildly opposes B and C. Similarly, Legislator 2
ardently favors B and modestly dislikes A and C. Legislator 3 strongly supports C and
bears a slight aversion towards A and B. These preferences are summarized in Table 1.
The status quo represents no change in policy and is indicated with an “X.” Utility
reflects the personal pleasure (or, when negative, displeasure) that each legislator
experiences when the corresponding policy is enacted.
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Table 1
Legislator 1

Legislator 2

Legislator 3

Policy

Utility

Policy

Utility

Policy

Utility

A

20

B

20

C

20

A+B+C

15

A+B+C

15

A+B+C

15

X

0

X

0

X

0

B

-2

C

-2

A

-2

C

-3

A

-3

B

-3

If the policies are voted upon separately, none will receive majority support. This
is because two of the three legislators prefer the status quo to any given policy. To
illustrate, policy B will receive support from Legislator 2; enacting B would increase her
utility by 20 units over the status quo. However, Legislators 1 and 3 would vote against
policy B, as it makes both of them worse off than the status quo. Similarly, A and C each
will receive one favorable vote and two unfavorable votes. In the absence of bargaining,
the legislature will be left with the status quo, which yields zero utilityfor everyone .
If bargaining is allowed, the legislators may agree to logroll A, B, and C into one
bill that will receive unanimous support. This will reward each member with her most
favored policy, albeit at the cost of implementing the others’ programs. Each legislator
will experience a net gain of 15 utility—20 from her preferred policy less 5 from the
other policies—for a total “social” gain of 45. This figure, 45 utility, is the cooperative
surplus of the bargain, the amount by which the legislators are collectively better off due
to logrolling.
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This example shows plainly the potential gains from legislative bargaining. It is,
however, simplistic. For one, it implies that every legislator plays a role in and benefits
from every bargain. In reality, this is not the case. Not all bills receive unanimous
support, and some legislators are excluded from legislative bargains and may be left
worse off because of them.197 To illustrate in the context of the example, Legislators 1
and 2 could logroll just A and B. That combination would produce greater utility for
them (18 and 17, respectively) than would the combination of A, B, and C (15 apiece).
In that scenario, Legislator 3 would be left out of the deal and would suffer a utility loss
of 5.198
In this iteration of the bargain, aggregate social utility is still positive (Legislators
1 and 2 collectively gained 35 utility, and Legislator 3 lost 5). Legislator 3 suffered from
this particular bargain, but there is no reason to suppose that this will systematically be
the case. Next time she may benefit at the expense of Legislator 1 or 2. On the whole,
logrolling is still socially beneficial. Unfortunately, a reworking of the utility figures can
change this rosy picture.
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Table 2
Legislator 1

Legislator 2

Legislator 3

Policy

Utility

Policy

Utility

Policy

Utility

A

20

B

20

C

2

A+B+C

15

A+B+C

15

A+B+C

-48

X

0

X

0

X

0

B

-2

C

-2

A

-20

C

-3

A

-3

B

-30

Now Legislator 3 mildly supports C and is strongly opposed to A and B. If
Legislators 1 and 2 logroll A and B, they still gain 35 utility, but Legislator 3 loses 50,
and thus aggregate utility is negative. In this circumstance, logrolling is socially
harmful.199
To preempt this outcome, Legislator 3 could bargain with the other legislators and
convince them not to pass A and B. For example, she could “pay” Legislator 2 with
future votes and other favors to break the logroll. Legislator 3 would be willing to pay
any amount up to the equivalent of 50 utility (her loss if A and B become law) to achieve
this result. Legislator 2 would be willing to break the logroll for any amount greater than
17 (her gain from logrolling A and B). Whether this maneuver is successful hinges on
the transaction costs of political bargaining. If the costs are low, Legislators 2 and 3 can
strike a deal, and bills A and B will not pass. Utility will be redistributed from 3 to 2, but
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aggregate utility will not decline. If the transaction costs of bargaining are high,
Legislators 2 and 3 may not be able to reach a deal. Time may be too short, or Legislator
3 may lack the capital (votes, etc.) to offer Legislator 2.200 In this case, the original
logroll of A and B will proceed, and aggregate utility will decline. This example yields a
prediction: as the transaction costs of political bargaining rise, logrolling will more often
be harmful.201
Note that, irrespective of the aggregate utility effects, every instance of logrolling
makes a majority of legislators better off. In the first example, logrolling A, B, and C
improved the positions of all three legislators. Each moved up her list of preferences
from the status quo to A+B+C. Likewise, in the last example, the bargain between
Legislators 1 and 2 increased their satisfaction. Both moved upwards from the status
quo.202 Thus, from a purely majoritarian perspective, logrolling looks benign. Every
instance of logrolling makes all of the participants—and thus a majority of legislators—
better off.
A final, significant wrinkle bears mentioning. The above examples refer only to
the implications of logrolling for legislators; constituents are ignored. If legislators
accurately represent all of their constituents, then the analysis carries over: legislators
and citizens will generally experience the same effects from vote trading. But this is
unrealistic. Preferences vary, and among the constituents of a given legislator, some will
benefit from a particular vote trade while others will suffer harm. At the extreme,
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legislators may trade votes in order to curry favor with powerful interest groups but leave
most of their constituents—and society as a whole—worse off.
The bottom line on logrolling is that it has the capacity to improve social welfare
but also to diminish it.203 The majority of legislators who participate in a legislative
bargain will always benefit; they move up their list of preferences. But the external
effects on the minority, non-participant legislators may be so large that the aggregate
social return is negative. Similarly, some constituents will gain from a particular vote
trade but others will suffer harm. Whether more constituents gain than lose—or whether
the aggregate utility gains to constituents exceed the losses—is indeterminate. In short,
the precise effects of logrolling can only be measured empirically.

B. Riders: Manipulations of the Legislative Process
Riding occurs when an unpopular bill get attached to a popular one and then
“rides” the popular bill through the legislature.204 Commentators generally characterize
riding as a species of logrolling,205 which may lead one to believe that the same analysis
from the last section applies. This is not the case. Riding isa separate practice, and it
can be distinguished from logrolling using the concept of exchange.
By definition, logrolling consists of exchange. When measures A and B are
logrolled, the supporters of A vote for the combined bill because they benefit from the
bargain; in exchange for their support of B, they receive votes in favor of A. Likewise,
203
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indeterminate.”).
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See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The term rider is often used more generally to refer to
additions to a bill that are not germane to its original content and to substantive measures that get attached
to appropriations bills. See Richard A. Riggs, Separation of Powers: Congressional Riders and the Veto
Power, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 735, 737-40 (1972-1973).
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See supra note 30.
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the supporters of B exchange their votes on A in order to secure majority support for B.
Implicitly or explicitly, all of the participants in a logroll are striking a bargain. They
give and they receive.
Riding does not involve exchange but rather manipulation of legislative
procedures. In certain situations, an unpopular measure can get attached to a popular
one, and the combined bill can be submitted to the full legislature for a vote. Depending
on the rules of procedure, the information available to legislators, and the transaction
costs of haggling, the unpopular measure may be irremovable. In that circumstance, the
combined bill amounts to a take-it-or-leave- it offer. Legislators can only choose between
the combined bill and the status quo. If the combined bill is superior, they will pass it,
even if a majority would prefer not to enact the unpopular provision. In this scenario, no
exchange has taken place. The supporters of the popular measure implicitly cast a vote
for the unpopular one, but they neither like the unpopular one nor gain anything in
exchange for their support of it. This observation leads to a definition of riders: a rider
is a political measure that lacks majority support and whose opponents vote for it without
receiving compensation from the measure’s supporters.
To clarify, consider the following situation. A legislature consists of ten
members, three of whom compose a committee with exclusive jurisdiction over measures
A and B. The seven non-committee members share the same preferences: they like A
and oppose B. The three committee members also share the same preferences: they
support both A and B. Table 3 expresses these preferences. As before, utility figures
have been assigned to each measure, and “X” refers to the status quo.206

206

In the interest of simplicity, this example assumes that A and B are independent from one another and
unrelated—they do not rely on one another to be effective, and nor do they contradict each other.
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Table 3
Non-committee members
(Legislators 1-7)
Policy
Utility

Committee members
(Legislators 8-10)
Policy
Utility

A

5

A+B

8

A+B

1

B

5

X

0

A

3

B

-4

X

0

Measure A enjoys unanimous support; all ten legislators prefer it to the status quo.
Thus, the committee members have an incentive to report A to the full legislature, where
it will pass. Measure B only commands minority support. The three committee members
support it, but the other seven legislators do not. Therefore, the committee members have
no incentive to report B to the full legislature, as it will be voted down. One final
possibility remains. The committee members could combine the measures and report
them to the full legislature as a single bill, AB. All ten legislators prefer AB to the status
quo, and this option yields the highest utility for committee members, 8 apiece. As a
result, the committee members may choose this third option and report out the combined
bill. If the seven non-committee members cannot excise measure B, they will vote for
the combined bill, as it leaves them better off (one utility) than the status quo (zero
utility).
In this scenario, B is a rider. It only has minority support (Legislators 8 through
10), and its opponents (Legislators 1 through 7) voted for it without receiving anything in
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exchange. They did not receive votes from the committee members on these or other
issues. For example, had the committee members pledged their support on a future issue
to some non-committee members in exchange for the non-committee members’ support
of B, B would be part of logroll, not a rider. An exchange like that did not take place.
Likewise, the non-committee members did not implicitly trade their votes on B for an
opportunity to vote on their preferred choice, A. Because the committee has exclusive
jurisdiction over A, it could use that as a bargaining chip. The committee members could
agree to report out A only if the non-committee members agreed to support B. Again,
that would constitute a logroll—the committee members would be giving up measure A,
and the non-committee members would be giving up B. But that exchange did not take
place, and nor would it in the scenario described above. The committee members do not
need an inducement to send A to the full legislature; they would benefit from its passage.
So even in the absence of measure B, the committee members would report out A. In
sum, no exchange, implicit or explicit, took place.
As with logrolling, the utility effects of riding are indeterminate. In the example
above, the passage of AB would generate 31 utility (one unit from each of Legislators 1
through 7 and eight units from each of Legislators 8 through 10). This is suboptimal—
the passage of A alone would generate 44 utility—but still superior to the status quo (zero
utility). Reworking the figures could easily change these results. For example, if each
committee member gained ten utility from B rather than five, the passage of AB would be
optimal, generating 46 utility (one each from Legislators 1 through 7 and 13 each from
Legislators 8 through 10). By contrast, if Legislators 6 and7 each suffered a utility loss
of 20 from the passage of B, aggregate utility would be negative. Legislators 1 through 5
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and 8 through 10 would still vote for AB, and their collective gain would be 29. But the
loss to Legislators 6 and 7 would be 40, leaving aggregate utility in the red.207 Since
representation is imperfect, the utility effects of riding on society at large are even harder
to judge. An instance of riding that yields an aggregate gain for legislators could create a
collective loss for their constituents.
The observation that riding, like logrolling, can be socially beneficial or socially
harmful emphasizes an important point: the distinction between these practices turns on
process, not outcome. An instance of logrolling and an instance of riding could yield
identical aggregate welfare effects. But the processes underlying those outcomes would
differ. The logroll would result from bargaining and compromise, while the rider would
stem from manipulations of legislative procedure, reliance on other legislators’ limited
information, and the high transaction costs of amendment.
Regardless of the utility effects, riding is anti-majoritarian: every instance of it
leaves a majority of legislators worse off. In the example above, seven of the ten
legislators preferred A to AB, and yet they were forced to accept the latter. Put more
generally, every instance of riding moves a majority down their list of preferences by
forcing them to accept a favored provision and an unfavorable rider rather than just the
favored provision. This contrasts with logrolling, every instance of which makes a
majority better off by moving them up their list of preferences.208
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If the transaction costs of political bargaining are low, Legislators 6 and 7 can strike a deal with other
non-committee members, transferring votes or other favors to them in exchange for votes against AB.
Alternatively, they can bargain with the committee members and offer them something in exchange for a
commitment not to attach B to A in the first place. If the transaction costs of bargaining are high, these
arrangements may be infeasible.
208
Lowenstein identified this distinction in his analysis of the single subject rule. See Lowenstein, supra
note 18, at 962.; see also supra note 30.
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This analysis of ridersmay, at first glance, appear to rest on rather restrictive
assumptions. For a rider to become law, its supporters must be able to use a procedural
device to attach it to a popular bill, and the rider’s opponentsmust then be unable to
remove it. I now will explain why these assumptions are reasonable.

1. The Committee System Allows For the Attachment of Riders
To understand how a rider gets attached to a bill requires an understanding of the
legislative committee system.209 American legislatures are divided into committees, each
with jurisdiction over a particular subject matter. Committees deliberate over bills that
fall within their jurisdiction. Sometimes these bills are initiated and drafted by a
committee member, and other times they are proposed by a non-member and then
referred to the committee. As suggested in the example above, most committees have
near-exclusive “gatekeeping” authority.210 The full legislature cannot vote on a bill
unless the committee to which the bill was assigned consents. In other words, unless the
committee “opens the gates,” no bill within its jurisdiction can be passed. This system
vests committees with a great deal of power.211
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There is no universally followed legislative process in the United States. The information I offer here is
general and draws in part on research that was focused on the U.S. Congress, not the state legislatures that
are constrained by the single subject rule. Nevertheless, the discussion captures the essence of most state
legislative procedures. See generally WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 53-75, 190-290 (10th ed. 2001) (noting the many similarities
between Congress and state legislatures with respect to processes that are relevant to this paper).
210
On gatekeeping in the states, see id. at 265 (with some exceptions, “there are few instances in which
[committees] lose control of measures referred to them”). On gatekeeping more generally and in Congress,
see KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND
INSTITUTIONS 327-28 (1997); see also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 85, 87 (1987) (noting that legislative
mechanisms exist by which to “pry the gates open,” but they are rarely used).
211
On the power of committees generally, see SHEPSLE & BONCHEK, supra note 210, 324-43; Shepsle &
Weingast, supra note 210; Keith Krehbiel, Kenneth A. Shepsle, & Barry R. Weingast, Why Are
Congressional Committees Powerful?, 81 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 929 (1987); see also GARY W. COX &
MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993)
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Much of the logrolling discussed in the last section takes place within committees;
members bargain with one another over specific provisions in a given bill.212 Of course,
non-committee members can also weigh in, offering support on a separate bill—which
may or may not get attached to the present bill213—in exchange for favors. Noncommittee members cannot, however, directly alter the provisions of a bill while it is in
committee.
This brief background is sufficient to explain how a rider gets attached to a bill in
the first place. Since committee members have exclusive control over the legislation that
falls within their jurisdiction and they cannot be forced to bargain, they cansimply ta ck
riders on. This can happen openly, where enough committee members support the rider
that they unabashedly include it in the bill.214 Or it can happen in secret, where a
committee member quietly writes in the rider during the drafting session.215

(discussing, among other things, the advantages conferred on the majority political party by the committee
system in the U.S. House of Representatives).
212
Cf. COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 211, 79, 248-49.
213
See id. at 248-49 (discussing “intercommittee logrolls” and the creation of omnibus bills that touch upon
the jurisdiction of more than one committee).
214
Committee members could logroll several riders into a single bill. For example, Committee Member 1
could agree to support the addition of Committee Members 2’s favored provision to a given bill in
exchange for 2’s support of the addition of 1’s favored provision. By my definition, this would constitute
logrolling at the committee level. However, this would not constitute logrolling with the full legislature.
Although Committee Members 1 and 2 made an exchange among themselves, they did not offer anything,
explicitly or implicitly, to other legislators. They expect their favored provisions to become law because
other legislators cannot remove them from the combined bill, not because they bargained with other
legislators and made an exchange that leaves a majority of all legislators in a superior position.
215
In November 2004, a dramatic example of this unfolded in the U.S. Senate when an unknown lawmaker
or staffer “slipped a provision into an omnibus spending bill that would have allowed two committee
chairmen to view the tax returns of any American.” Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist said “he did not
know who was responsible for inserting the language.” See
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/21/tax.provision/index.html, Jan. 8, 2005.
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2. Legislative Rules and Imperfect Markets for Votes Prevent Riders from Being
Excised
The committee system facilitates the attachment of riders, but it does not
guarantee that riders will remain intact when they reach the floor of the legislature. To
understand why riders are not always removed once they leave committee requires an
understanding of legislative rules.
When a committee brings a proposed bill to the full legislature, a set of rules
governs how the legislature will deliberate on that bill.216 The rules regulate the “amount
of time devoted to debate, how that time is divided between proponents and opponents,
and, most importantly, what amendments are in order, if any.”217 The rules may be predetermined, or they may be tailored to the bill in question.218 With respect to allowing
amendments, the rules can be arranged along a spectrum of restrictiveness, with a “closed
rule” on one end and an “open rule” on the other. Under a closed rule, amendments are
forbidden.219 The bill can be voted upon as is, but it cannot be amended. Under an open
rule, amendments are unrestricted.220
A closed rule offers a number of potential benefits. It allows for expedient
passage of important bills, prevents legislative cycling on the floor, and encourages
reliance on specialized committees.221 But it also allows for riding. Committee members
can attach a rider and then send the complete bill to the full legislature, where the
chamber cannot remove it. This amounts to a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the
216

See SHEPSLE & BONCHEK, supra note 210, at 335. In Congress, the rules are devised primarily by rules
committees. In state legislatures, the rules come from rules committees as well as calendar committees,
factions, and legislative leadership. See Keefe & Ogul, supra note 209, at 264-65.
217
SHEPSLE & BONCHEK, supra note 210, at 335.
218
See id.
219
See id. at 120-25, 336.
220
See id. at 125-32, 335.
221
For a discussion of these theories and others, see KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE
ORGANIZATION 151-91 (1991).
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committee. If the legislature prefers the “offer” to the status quo, it will pass the bill with
the rider, even if most legislators would prefer the bill without the rider.
In a voting market with perfect information, costless political bargaining, long
time horizons, and repeat play, riders would not survive under a closed rule. All riders
would be discovered, and bills containing riders would be sent back to committee to be
reworked. For any riders they attach today, legislators would rationally expect to be
penalized in a future political exchange, and they would therefore have an incentive not
to attach riders in the first place. But these conditions do not hold in the real world.
Information is not perfect. Legislators may not know about a rider, or they may not know
who proposed it and, thus, who they should punish.222 Political bargaining is not costless.
Sending a bill with a rider back to committee may be infeasible if the bill is urgent or if
other important bills are in the queue and the opportunity costs are substantial. And
interactions among legislators are finite. Legislators come and go every couple of years;
the incumbency rates in state legislatures tend to be lower than in Congress.223 Indeed,
the mere threat of an electoral loss could lead an otherwise cooperative legislator to
attach a self-serving rider to curry favor with his constituents. Thus, repeat play and
reputation effects are insufficient to deter bad behavior.224 For these reasons, closed rules
can facilitate riding.
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See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
In 1994, over 90 percent of the members of both houses of Congress were reelected. By contrast,
“eighteen state houses and twenty-three state senates had turnover rates in excess of 25 percent between
1992 and 1994.” In several states, newcomers made up about half of at least one of the legislative
chambers. See Keefe & Ogul, supra note 209, at 163, 166.
224
For a brief discussion of repeat play in legislatures, see Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The
Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96
J. POL. ECON. 132, 141-42 (1988). For a theory of how legislative institutions are used to overcome the
repeat play dilemma and other problems that may hinder political bargaining, see id.
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In contrast to closed rules, open rules do not allow committees to make explicit
take-it-or-leave-it offers, and this diminishes the opportunities for riding. Amendments
can be used to excise riders on the floor. Still, it is possible for riders to slip through.
“Pure” open rules are rare, and the number of allowable amendments is usually limited.
Complex regulations govern the order in which amendments can be made and by whom,
and this can limit the opportunities to remove riders.225 Moreover, legislatures operating
under an open rule are subject to the same market imperfection as those using a closed
rule. Information asymmetries, transactions costs, and end-game dilemmas can prevent
riders from being extracted. These problems are particularly severe at the close of
legislative sessions, when state legislatures operate at a frenetic pace. “It is not unusual
to find 30 to 40 percent of all bills passed during a session receiving final approval in the
last week before adjournment.”226 In situations like this, riders can survive even under an
open rule.227

3. Summary of Riders
Riders do not result from political bargaining but rather a manipulation of
legislative procedures. Notwithstanding its many benefits, the committee system permits
legislators to attach unpopular measures to otherwise popular bills. Notwithstanding their
many benefits, legislative rules can prevent riders from being excised. This situation is

225

See Barry R. Weingast, Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule,
83 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 795, 800-801 (1989).
226
Keefe & Ogul, supra note 209, at 266.
227
Cf. Weingast, supra note 225 (explaining that committee proposals in the U.S. Congress enjoy high
success rates under open rules because of the restrictions placed on the amendment process by customs,
rules of recognition, etc.).
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exacerbated by imperfections in the market for votes. The end result is that riders
become law, and theymove a majority of legislators down their list of preferences.

C. Public Choice Theory and Political Transparency
Ensuring that the contents of legislation are comprehensible is a fundamental but
sometimes underappreciated228 purpose of the single subject rule. This purpose is
underpinned by three assumptions: (1) legislators and citizens sometimes do not fully
grasp legislation; (2) this information problem can lead to inferior lawmaking, and
improving access to information would improve the quality of law; and (3) confining acts
to a single subject willhelp to achieve this result .
With regard to the first assumption, the evidence is pretty clear. When “the
legislative juggernaut … gets rolling,” legislators often cannot keep track of the details of
bills and their implications.229 With regard to citizens, there can be little doubt that some
legislation is incomprehensible. This may be due to the complex nature of some aspects
of public policy, the sheer size of a particular bill, simple (and perhaps rational)
ignorance, or more cynically, the efforts of politicians to keep their constituents in the
dark.
The second assumption is clearly accurate as well. If lawmakers are unaware of
the content of bills, the quality of legislation will decline. They cannot remove riders or
vote against unfavorable provisions if they do not know about them. Similarly, if citizens
cannot understand legislation, the incentive for legislators to pass self-serving,
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Even opinions that discuss the single subject rule at length sometimes fail to recognize this purpose. See,
e.g., Porten Sullivan Corp., 568 A.2d at 1115-22.
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Denning & Smith, supra note 10, at 958; see also supra note 215.
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undesirable laws rises. These ideas are captured by public choicetheory, which provides
a strong case for transparency in lawmaking.
Representative government can be described as a principal-agent game, where the
public is the principal and legislators act as the principal’s agents.230 The premise of such
games is that agents’ interests do not automatically align with the principal’s, so
delegating authority to agents entails risks. A solution to the principal-agent problem is
to monitor agents’ behavior and establish a mechanism for punishing disloyalty.
Elections provide such a mechanism.231 If citizens base their votes on evaluations of
performance, legislators who pass bad laws will face defeat at the polls.232 This should
lead legislators to behave more responsibly. The trick, then, is the monitoring. Political
processes can be opaque, and citizens lack the time and attention for careful
monitoring.233 Any method of making monitoring easier should lead legislators to act in
the public interest and pass better laws.
So far, I have argued that legislators and citizens sometimes do not understand
legislation, that this ignorance can lead to undesirable laws, and that improving access to
information will mitigate this problem. The next issue is whether the single subject rule
can be helpful in this regard. Proponents of the rule assume that it can. Confining acts to
one subject and requiring their titles to express their contents should make legislation
230

See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, 50 PUBLIC CHOICE 5, 8 (1986).
See generally id.; Robert J. Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 PUBLIC CHOICE
19 (1973).
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See Ferejohn, supra note 230, at 7 (citing V.O. KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE (1966)); see also
COOTER, supra note 187, at 175 (“When voters are well informed, winning elections requires giving the
voters what they want.”); see also Alicia Adsera et al., Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and
Quality of Government, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 445 (2003) (providing empirical support for the hypothesis
that better monitoring will curb the opportunities for legislators to act self-interestedly and force them to
more accurately represent their constituents).
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See generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS
LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998). Because citizens lack the time for careful monitoring, they
rely on political cues from other sources, including interest groups and the media. See id. As political
transparency improves, these cues will become more accurate and cheaper to acquire.
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easier to understand. This should help legislators to identify and vote against unpopular
provisions. It also should make it easier for citizens to monitor their representatives and
the policies that they support.
These arguments have intuitive force, but they are too simplistic. When
legislators logroll, they exchange their support of one measure for support on another
measure. If those measures have to be separated into two bills, legislators who are not
party to the logroll may examine the first bill, fail to perceive the underlying bargain
(which they might support), and vote against it. This would not change the outcome; the
measures would still be approved by the favorable votes of those who participated in the
logroll. But the legislator who erroneously voted against the first provision might regret
his decision. He may prefer that his record not include a vote against a provision whose
passage was integral to the subsequent implementation of a law he strongly supports. He
also would benefit generally from understanding what political deals are unfolding
around him. As this scenario demonstrates, allowing several measures to be combined in
one act may improve legislators’ information by helping them to recognize political
bargains and compromises.
For the same reasons, reducing the number of provisions in a bill does not
necessarily make it easier for citizens to monitor their representatives. It clouds the
tradeoffs their representatives are required to make on a routine basis. To illustrate,
assume that San Franciscans strongly support a proposed business practice, A, and mildly
approve of another practice, B. Bills that would legalize these practices are pending in the
legislature, but only B will pass on its own merits. The legislator representing San
Francisco guarantees that A will pass by trading her vote on measure B, ensuring its
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defeat. If bills A and B are voted on separately, San Franciscans will disapprove of their
legislator’s voting record. They will see that she voted against measure B, which they
favor. On the other hand, if the bills can be combined—perhaps into one act that legalizes
A and forbids B—citizens are more likely to perceive the underlying bargain. With a
combined bill, the legislator can more credibly justify her actions, explaining that she had
to sacrifice B to get A. Likewise, citizens—and interest groups, media, and other
consumers of political information—can more easily perceive her intentions.234
Based on this analysis, strict application of the single subject rule is
counterproductive with respect to making legislation and the lawmaking process more
transparent. It slices political compromises into discrete frames, simplifying the
monitoring of individual bills but obscuring the tradeoffs that underlie them.

D. GubernatorialInfluence and Legislative Bargains
Courts tend not to identify a constitutional relationship between the single subject
rule and governors’ veto power. But as a practical matter, the two are clearly related: the
broader the definition of permissible subjects, the more constrained is the governor’s
ability to exercise a veto.235 This tradeoff between the breadth of acts and executive
authority implicates separation of powers concerns. Although public choice theory has
much to say about the separation of powers, most of that line of inquiry is beyond the
scope of this paper. What is relevant is the role governors play in legislative bargains, as
that relates closely to issues of logrolling and riding.
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This example was developed from ideas in COOTER, supra note 187, at 64.
See Harbor, 742 P.2d at 1299.

60

Despite the formal separation of the executive and legislative branches, observers
have long recognized that governors play an indirect but prominent role in lawmaking.236
This can be attributed to several factors. First, unlike legislators, governors represent their
entire states, putting them in the best position to identify the needs of the whole
electorate.237 This can help them to set the legislative agenda and, through the prestige of
the office, garner support for their proposals.238 Second, governors usually exert strong
influence on their state political parties.239 Legislators who belong to the governor’s party
can guide the governor’s favored bills through the legislature, particularly if they occupy
leadership positions.240 Third, governors propose the state budget, which is the “single
most important document in determining the policy initiatives and goals of
government.”241 Fourth, and most significantly, governors possess the veto, which can be
used as a bargaining tool to secure legislative support.242 Unless enough legislators
support a bill to override a veto, the bill must, on balance, be satisfactory to the executive.
For these reasons and many others, the seal between governors and legislatures is less
than tight.
Gubernatorial influence in the legislative process can give rise to the activities
that are condemned by courts interpreting the single subject rule. To illustrate, assume
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that a governor publicly committed herself to passing a provision, A, that most legislators
oppose. She could use her influence to combine that measure with others into one bill that
would receive majority support. Assuming that legislators who oppose but nevertheless
vote for A receive something for their sacrifice, this would be a classic case of logrolling.
If, on the other hand, the governor did not organize a broad bargain but rather convinced
a committee member to add A to another bill, A would be a rider.
Several observations can be drawn from this discussion. For one, instances of
logrolling and riding may not solely be the work of the legislature. Governors can play
an indirect role in these practices, so courts may not wish to confine their wrath to the
legislative branch. Second, courts should be cautious about using the single subject rule
to strengthen the veto power. The executive has other means of affecting legislative
outcomes. Third, strict interpretations of the single subject rule strengthen the veto
power but do not necessarily represent a net gain for governors. A stringent reading of the
rule would force legislators to pass narrow bills, each of which would be subject to the
governor’s veto. This would appear to strengthen the governor’s hand. But that same
stringent interpretation would restrict the governor’s ability to orchestrate legislative
bargains. This would be especially true among unstable coalitions—for example, when
the legislature is fractured, or the governor and legislative majority are from different
political parties. In situations like those, would-be vote traders may lack the trust to
logroll across separate acts. This could prevent the governor from enacting legislation he
favors. As a result, a strict reading of the single subject rule does not necessarily
augment executive power.
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The approach to single subject adjudication advocated in Part IV does not discuss
cases that are premised on erosion of the gubernatorial veto. A full treatment of these
disputes would require deeper consideration of the many factors that weigh on the
appropriate separation of powers. This is beyond the scope of the paper. Nevertheless,
the analysis in this section may aid courts in scrutinizing some of the arguments that arise
in these cases.

IV. A NEW APPROACH TO SINGLE SUBJECT ADJUDICATION
As Part I made clear, the single subject rule has generated substantial amounts of
litigation over the last 150 years, including cases on important, visible public issues. As
Part II illustrated, single subject jurisprudence is murky; this is due in large part to the
vagueness of the rule itself. As Part III showed, the historical purposes of the ruledo not
necessarily rest on firm analytical footing. In light of these observations, courts,
legislators, and citizens alike would benefit from a more cogent approach to the single
subject rule. In this Part, I offer such an approach. The proposal aims to provide courts
with clearer direction and legislatures with greater flexibilityand a predictable and
beneficial constraint on their activities.
Before proceeding, I should emphasize two points. First, the proposal is
necessarily normative in character, and readers may disagree with my judgment on
different issues. My hope is to flag ideas that are relevant to single subject adjudication,
even if the precise contours of the proposal are rejected. Second, the proposal calls for
some dramatic changes to single subject jurisprudence. Revising the text of state
constitutions would be the cleanest method of implementing those changes. Failing that,
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state judges could still import much of my proposal under the guise of the rule’s broad
language. This Part develops a definition of a single subject that courts could insert into
their jurisprudence. In any event, my goal is to provide a superior framework for
resolving single subject disputes, not identify the precise means through which it can be
adopted.

A. Courts Should Condone Logrolling
As discussed in Part III, logrolling is tantamount to vote trading, and every
instance of it improves the well being of a majority of legislators. Legislators not
involved in a given bargain may be left worse off because of it.243 However, those
legislators may be able to improve their positions through other deals. One of the virtues
of logrolling is that it encourages the formation of coalitions based not on ideology but
rather political capital. So a legislator who is in the minority politically—and who thus
loses out on some legislation—nevertheless can join and benefit from bargains with other
factions.244 But this does not prove that logrolling is socially beneficial. Even if every
legislator benefits at some point from logrolling, the practice is still undesirable if, on the
whole, the losers lose more than the winners win.
If logrolling were always detrimental, then a flat ban on it would be sensible. If
logrolling were always beneficial, then a ban would be misplaced. In reality, logrolling is
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Note, however, that those parties may have been left out of the deal by their own choosing. See Clayton
P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV.
625, 637 n.35 (1994) (“All representatives have an opportunity to logroll, so the fact that representative A
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excluded.”).
244
See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 16, at 172 (arguing that logrolling allows minority
legislators to obtain government benefits for marginalized groups); Gillette, supra note 243, at 636
(“[B]ecause coalition building will often require an effective logroll, minority representation in legislative
dealmaking should be enhanced by vote trading.”).
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probably in between. Sometimes it helps, and sometimes it hurts. This would not present
a problem if courts had perfect information and judicial review was costless. Judges
could distinguish between beneficial and harmful logrolls and only strike down the latter.
Time spent on filtering logrolls would not be socially costly. Of course, these conditions
do not hold. An act that looks harmful may be integral to the subsequent passage of an
act that generates substantial social returns.245 Striking down the first act could scuttle
the deal. Alternatively, legislation that seems sound could, due to shifts in the many
variables that affect public policy, yield social losses. Indeed, the very terms beneficial
and harmful imply a metric for sorting good laws from bad ones. But is that metric based
on utility maximization, satisfaction of preferences, equity, efficiency, or something else?
And over what timeframe would the metric be calculated? Because of these intractable
information problems, there is no reason to suppose that courts can accurately distinguish
between beneficial and detrimental logrolls. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that
case-by-case judicial review will produce a social benefit.246
The key, then, is to adopt a presumption about logrolling that minimizes overall
social costs.247 If, on average, logrolling produces a social benefit, broadly defined, then
courts should presume that every instance of logrolling is allowable, since they cannot
tell which logrolls produce a benefit and which do not.248 If, on average, logrolling
causes harm, and if the benefits of judicial review outweigh the costs, then logrolling
should be banned, and courts should review legislation and strike down logrolled bills.249
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I argue that courts should adopt a presumption in favor of logrolling. They should
assume that logrolling on the whole is socially beneficial, and therefore individual
logrolled bills are constitutionally sound.
To make my normative case, consider first the limited effects of a presumption
against logrolling. Before striking anything down, courts would have to identify
instances of logrolling. If the logrolling took place within a single bill, they may have
some success. If, however, the logrolling took place across separate bills, then the single
subject rule would provide no guidance. Each individual bill would embrace one subject.
Stable legislative coalitions could logroll across separate bills, and judges could not use
the rule to stop them.
If same-bill logrolls are usually harmful, then invalidating them would be
sensible, even if they only represent a fraction of all logrolls. If, however, same-bill
logrolls tend to be beneficial, then invalidating them would leave society worse off.
Gillette provides a reason to believe that same-bill logrolls will often be beneficial.250
Legislators orchestrating the most egregious trades have a strong incentive to spread them
across separate bills. Doing so makes it harder for the public to uncover the nefarious
arrangement. Legislators operating for the public good would be less secretive about
their bargain and more likely to present it as a single measure. Ironically, these
beneficial, same-bill logrolls would get struck down.251 According to this argument, the
single subject rule will tend to strike down those logrolls that are most beneficial.
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See id. at 663.
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So far the discussion has assumed that the single subject rule can only be used to
attack same-bill logrolls. But if constitutional revision is a possibility, the rule could be
expanded to ban all logrolling, irrespective of whether it takes place in a single bill or
across separate ones. In light of Gillette’s argument, the rule could even be tailored to
ban only separate-bill logrolls, under the assumption that they are harmful and same-bill
logrolls are not. For these reasons, my argument must rest on more than theoretical
differences between same-bill and separate-bill logrolls. I provide more general
arguments in favor of logrolling in the following paragraphs.
Consider the incentives of legislators. Legislators can be expected to recognize
whether logrolling systematically harms them
. 252 Information gaps may prevent them
from knowing whether a given sequence of trades will, on the whole, make them better or
worse off. But over entire legislative sessions and, in the case of many politicians,
multiple terms, rational legislators should be able to discern whether logrolling is
beneficial.253 If it is not, we would expect them to ban the practice or take other steps to
make it less harmful. For example, legislators may implement measures that lower the
transaction costs of political bargaining, which would reduce the incidence of vote trades
that are harmful to them. It is hard to imagine legislators permitting an institutional
arrangement that works against their self interest to endure.254
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See Eric M. Uslaner & J. Ronnie Davis, The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and
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Cf. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 187, at 53 (noting that “[n]atural selection” would weed out a
legislature that did not develop checks on legislative cycling and other occurrences that work against,
among other things, the self-interest of legislators).
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One could respond that the existence of the single subject rule implies that
legislators are harmed by logrolling and seek to prevent it. After all, legislators created
the rule in the first place. This argument is unconvincing. If legislators really sought to
eliminate logrolling, they would ban it outright, not adopt a vague rule that attacks
logrolling indirectly. Moreover, the historical rationale for the single subject rule seems
to be directed at preventing riding and deception, not logrolling per se.255 For these
reasons, courts are not bound by original intent to invalidate all logrolls until the
legislature says otherwise.256 The original intent is ambiguous.
Beyond the gains it yields to legislators, logrolling smoothes the edges of the
lawmaking framework. As discussed in Part III, legislatures are divided into committees
with near-exclusive gatekeeping authority. This arrangement produces a number of
benefits, but it also has costs, including this one: committeescan close the gates on bills
that fall within their jurisdiction and that, despite promising substantial benefits to the rest
of the legislature and society more generally, are disagreeable to the committee members.
For example, a situation could arise in which a measure A is supported by most
legislators and citizens but not the members of the committee to which A is assigned. If
logrolling is forbidden, the committee cannot be induced to open the gates and report A
to the full legislature.257 Legislators cannot offer the committee members support on
other measures in exchange for an opportunity to vote on A. By contrast, if logrolling is
allowed, legislators can strike a deal. The committee will report out A in exchange for
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support on another measure it holds dear. Logrolling in this scenario preserves the
advantages of the committee system and reduces one of the costs. It prevents gridlock on
important issues whenever the preferences of a committee diverge from the preferences
of the full legislature.258
Even if logrolling tends to benefit legislators and grease the hinges of their
organizational framework, the practice may nevertheless harm society.
Politicians respond to organized interest groups within their constituencies.259 If
legislators logroll to help those groups, legislators may profit—through campaign
contributions and other favors—while the rest of the legislator’s constituents and, on
balance, society as a whole suffers.260
While legislators almost certainly respond more to organized groups than to
scattered individuals, they still need to garner enough votes to win elections. Doing so
requires them to take actions that benefit most of their constituents.261 Thus, legislators
can only execute self-serving but socially harmful logrolls if they can keep those logrolls
out of the public eye. Such deception may be possible when the policy matter is
complicated or obscure. It would also help if the legislative coalition was stable, and the
258

For an overview of the representativeness of committees in Congress, see Keefe & Ogul, supra note
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logroll could be spread subtly across multiple bills. But when its social implications are
substantial and plainly negative, a logroll is likely to attract considerable publicity. This
may be true even if the logroll’s components are distributed over separate acts. So for
legislators to engage in self-serving logrolling that they know is harmful, the aggregate
social loss must be relatively modest.262
Based on this analysis, the average social loss from harmful instances of
logrolling should be modest. By contrast, the average social gain from beneficial
instances of logrolling could be substantial. After all, there is no shame in forging a
popular compromise, and no limit on social gains that politicians dare not pass. The
question, then, is how frequently harmful and beneficial logrolls arise. If there are equal
numbers of both, or more beneficial logrolls than harmful ones, the average logroll
should be beneficial. If there are more harmful logrolls than beneficial ones, the average
logroll may be harmful. The answer to this question turns on transparency and
representativeness. The more transparent the lawmaking process, the more representative
legislators will be of all their constituents; otherwise they will face defeat at the polls.
And the more representative legislators are, the more logrolls will tend to be beneficial—
not just to legislators, but to society as well.263
Whether a given legislature is so transparent and representative that harmful
logrolls are relatively uncommon and thus average logrolls are beneficial is hard to know.
What is clear is the direction of causality—lack of transparency should lead to more
harmful logrolls. Banning logrolling will not unwind this chain. Because enforcement of
anti-logrolling laws is necessarily imperfect, legislators will continue to trade votes as
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long as the expected payoff from doing so is positive. But with a ban in place, they will
refuse to acknowledge that they trade, and they will have incentives to spread logrolls
across as many bills as possible to minimize the risk of detection. This obviously cuts
against transparency. In contrast, permitting logrolling will allow legislators to speak
openly about trading votes and reduce the incentive to tuck their bargains piecemeal into
the folds of several bills.
Granted, condoning vote trading would permit some harmful logrolls to succeed
where they otherwise would have failed. Legislators who lacked the trust to spread a
nefarious logroll across separate acts (and thus try to sidestep a logrolling ban) could
include their bargain in a single bill under a regime of legal vote trading. But harmful
logrolls of this sort would be the ones most likely to come to light. And legalized vote
trading would permit more beneficial logrolls to succeed as well.
In short, logrolls that harm society are a product of bad representation, and
representation is a function of transparency. Banning logrolling cuts against
transparency; legislators will simply hide their vote trades, not halt them. Therefore
courts should do the opposite. Condoning logrolling would improve transparency and
reduce the incidence of harmful vote trades.
A final issue bears mentioning. Despite my arguments, one may conclude that
logrolling tends to be socially harmful and should be banned. However, this does not
lead inevitably to the conclusion that courts should use the single subject rule or some
other device to enforce such a ban. Judicial review is costly, and the costsincurred in
fighting logrolls may overwhelm the benefits. Courts can only address a certain number
of cases in a given period, and if logrolling cases clutter the dockets, other important
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cases will go unaddressed. In addition, judicial review theoretically raises the transaction
costs of passing legislation. To guard against judicial error and the invalidation of nonlogrolled bills, legislators would have an incentive to pass narrower legislation. Passing
narrower bills would raise transaction costs, since every bill has to undergo a separate
deliberation and vote. Because legislators can only deal with a limited number of issues
in a given session, these transaction costs could prevent pressing laws from being
enacted. Taken together, these costs could be substantial.
For all of the reasons suggested, courts should condone the practice of logrolling.
This would save judges from puzzling over whether all provisions of a bill are
“reasonably germane” to one another. They could simply assume that a bill’s provisions,
no matter how disparate, belong together because they are logically connected in
legislator’s minds or because they resulted from a successful logroll. It would also widen
the sphere of legislative cooperation. Legislators who have no interest in subjects related
to provision A nevertheless could participate in a logroll by proposing the addition of an
unrelated provision, B. This would give legislators more leverage to bargain and lead to
broader and more efficient logrolling.264
The public choice approach lays the foundation for a definition of a single subject.
A bill can be said to embrace but one subject when all of its provisions command
majority support due to their individual merits or legislative bargaining. If a bill
combines several popular measures in order to save legislative transaction costs, courts
should not interfere, and they would not under this definition. If a bill’s provisions
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resulted from a logroll, courts should presume that the arrangement was beneficial, and
under this definition, they would.
Although condoning logrolling would reverse an ingrained presumption in single
subject jurisprudence, it would not obviate the rule.

B. Courts Should Invalidate Bills Containing Riders
When a bill containing a rider is passed, a majority of legislators is left worse off.
They oppose the rider on its face and received nothing in exchange for their support of it.
This does imply that every rider is socially harmful. As discussed in Part III, a rider
produces a net benefit when the utility gains to its supporters outweigh the losses to its
opponents.265 So whether a given rider is socially beneficial is an empirical question.
As with logrolling, courts cannot possibly filter beneficial riders from harmful
ones. Doing so would require, among other things, a metric for determining social
effects and an agreed upon timeframe over which to measure them. The proper course,
then, is to adopt a presumption about riders that minimizes social costs and apply it
uniformly to every bill. If riding tends to be beneficial, courts should condone it in every
case. If riding is usually harmful, and if the benefits of judicial review outweigh the
costs, then it should be prohibited.
I propose that courts adopt a presumption against riding. Every bill containing a
rider should be condemned for violating the single subject rule.
The case against riders is straightforward. As discussed, a majority of legislators
opposes every rider that gets passed. Despite the theoretical ambiguity, this suggests that
265
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in practice riders will tend to cause more harm than good—or at least lead to suboptimal
outcomes. More importantly, condoning riders would set a dangerous precedent. It
would discourage legislators from compromising, which is costly when it requires them
to moderate their positions and trade away votes, and encourage them to ride their
favored provisions on popular bills. Surely a system that provides legislators with
incentives to bargain and compromise will produce better outcomes than one that
encourages them to sneak unpopular provisions into bills and make take-it-or-leave- it
offers. For these reasons, I conclude that riding is socially harmful.
A prohibition on riders will only be effective if courts can identify them and root
them out. The traditional single subject tests are unhelpful in this regard. Bills
containing unrelated provisions could be the product of logrolling, not riding. Courts
need a more sophisticated approach to distinguish riders from logrolls, and I propose one
here.
Consider first a world in which courts have perfect information about legislators’
voting preferences. This is less restrictive than assuming that courts can filter beneficial
logrolls and riders from harmful ones; it does not require knowledge of the intensity of
preferences or the social effects of legislation over time. Still, it is unrealistic, and I will
relax it in a moment.
Armed with perfect information, courts could follow these steps to identify riders.
First, they would separate a bill into its functionally related components.266 A
functionally related component is one whose provisions all rely on one another to be
266

This notion of functional relationships is drawn from a proposal raised by Justice Manuel of the
California Supreme Court in the context of initiatives. See Schmitz v. Younger, 577 P.2d 652, 656 (Cal.
1978) (Manuel, J., dissenting). Dividing bills into functionally related components prevents provisions that
complement one another—for example, a tax measure and a spending measure, neither of which is valuable
on its own but both of which are very valuable together—from failing the test.
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effective. To illustrate, if a measure A collects revenues for expenditure on a measure B,
the measures have a functional relationship and collectively should be treated as one
component of the bill. A measure C that is topically related to A and B but can be
substantially effective without them would be a separate component. Once all of the
functionally related components were identified, a court would ask this question about
each one: assuming all legislators adhere to their promises, if this component were
removed and voted upon separately, would it receive majority support? If the answer is
no, the component is a rider, and the bill violates the single subject rule.
The intuition behind this test runs as follows. There are three types of provisions
in any bill that receives majority support—popular ones that would pass on their own
merits, provisions that are being logrolled, and riders. Popular provisions would get
majority support regardless of whether they were coupled with other measures, s o the test
would never mistakenly implicate them
. Similarly, the test

would not mistake a logrolled

component for a rider. Legislators logroll to garner majority support for their favored
measures. To ensure that they receive such support, they must promise to give up their
votes on other measures. If they follow through on their promises, they will vote for all
measures involved in the trade. As a result, all logrolled components would receive
majority support, and this is true regardless of whether the components were voted upon
in the same or separate bills. In contrast, more legislators oppose riders than favor them,
and no one promises, explicitly or implicitly, to vote for a rider. They are forced to do so
by legislative rules and procedures. If a rider were voted upon separately, it would not
receive majority support.267
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Two examples will clarify this test. Assume first that 100 legislators are deliberating over two unrelated
measures, A and B. A is supported by legislators 1 to 40 and opposed by everyone else. B is supported by
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This test offers a framework for parsing riders from logrolls and independently
popular measures. Of course, applying the test is considerably more difficult than
articulating it. Determining which components have a functional relationship would
involve some discretion. And courts cannot determine with precision how faithful
legislators would have voted if a given bill were divided into separate components. This
is particularly true given that legislators often have incentives to conceal their true
preferences. Nevertheless, the test has practical merit. Courts need not be absolutely
accurate in every case. As long as they can identify some riders without incurring too
many costs—by, for example, striking down popular or logrolled legislation—then
judicial review is worthwhile. I believe they can glean enough information to do so.
First, courts could look to the legislative process that produced the bill.
Provisions added on the floor could not be riders since they received majority support
legislators 41 to 80 and opposed by everyone else. Now assume that A and B are logrolled into one bill
and that legislators 1 to 80 support this exchange (i.e., the gain to each legislator from enacting his favored
provision outweighs the loss from enacting the unfavorable provision). Now imagine that the committee
with jurisdiction over A and B consists of legislators 1 to 5 and 41 to 44. These nine legislators support
measure C; all 89 other legislators oppose it. Suppose the committee attaches C to AB and reports the bill
to the legislature, where ABC passes with 55 votes (for legislators 1 to 20, 41 to 65, and 81 to 90, ABC
yields a net benefit). If A were removed and voted upon separately, and if all legislators kept their
promises, A would still command 80 votes—legislators 1 to 80 would faithfully vote for A as part of their
agreement (which was implicitly contingent on nothing else getting attached to AB). The same would hold
for B. C, however, would not receive majority support. Only nine legislators (1 to 5 and 41 to 44) would
vote for it as a standalone measure. It only passed in the first place because, despite their disdain for it, a
sufficient number of supporters of AB felt that ABC was superior to nothing. Those legislators did not
promise to support C and would not do so if they could vote on A, B, and C in piecemeal fashion. The test
would properly identify C as a rider. Note that the committee has an incentive to report out AB (because
they support the logroll) even if they know that C will be eliminated because it is a rider.
Now assume that legislators 1 to 40 still support A, legislators 41 to 80 still support B, and they all
implicitly agree to logroll the two provisions. This time the committee with jurisdiction over A and B
consists of legislators 81 to 89. These nine legislators are opposed to A and B but support measure C.
They are the only legislators who like C. In exchange for reporting out A and B, the committee extracts
promises from legislators 1 to 80 to vote for C. If A and B were removed and voted upon separately, and if
all legislators kept their promises, they would both receive votes from legislators 1 to 80 (legislators 81 to
89 did not technically agree to vote for A and B, they just agreed to open the gates and report them to the
full legislature). If C were removed and voted upon separately, it would receive votes from legislators 1 to
89. Despite its individual unpopularity, C is a bargained for provision, not a rider, and the test would
properly identify it as part of a logroll. Note that if C were considered a rider and would be struck down,
the committee would have no incentive to open the gates and report AB to the full legislature, regardless of
whether AB promised a substantial social benefit.
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from the full legislature. Thus, judicial analysis would be limited to those provisions that
were attached to the bill before it emerged from committee. Legislation that was adopted
under a relatively closed rule should be subject to greater scrutiny than legislation passed
with a relatively open rule. In making this determination, courts should consider how
many amendments were allowed on the floor, how many non-committee members were
recognized, and whether amendments with respect to any particular provisions in the bill
were restricted. Second, courts could consider the legislative history of the bill. The
focus should not be on the records of the bill’s drafters but rather on the rest of the
legislators who, on the floor of the legislature, voted for it.268 The key question is
whether enough of those legislators would, if the bill’s components had been voted on
separately, withdraw their votes from a component such that it lacked majority support.
Proof that several legislators sought to remove a provision of the bill before voting for it
could be evidence of riding. Finally, courts could review voting records, political
affiliation, and even poll data to hypothesize how legislators would vote on a truncated
bill.269
If judges made clear that information of this nature would be relevant in single
subject disputes, parties to a case would have a strong incentive to produce it. One of the
reasons single subject litigation is so frequent is that it is easy to invoke the rule.
Litigants need only dream up a plausible formulation under which the components of the

268

Cf. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History:
New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1422-23
(2003) (arguing that courts should not look to the legislative history of a bill’s drafters when interpreting
the bill’s meaning because those drafters are “typically ardent supporters who have strategic incentives to
expand the meaning of the act … and to minimize the impact of the changes necessary to gain the
moderates’ support”).
269
For an example of a court using many of the tools identified in this paragraph to predict confidently how
the legislature would have voted on a particular bill, see Porten Sullivan Corp., 568 A.2d at 1122.

77

challenged act relate to more than one subject.270 Because multiple subjects are
understood to constitute logrolling or riding, litigants need not inquire into the actual
legislative activities that gave rise to the act. Requiring that litigants produce information
on legislative history would weed out weak single subject challenges and thereby save
judicial resources. It would also provide judges with at least some tangible data on which
to base their decisions.
In addition to putting more of the burden on litigants, judicial demands for
information on the legislative history of challenged bills could change legislators’
behavior. Fearing that popular provisions and logrolls would be mistaken for riders,
legislators would have an incentive to keep better records. Legislative histories could
explain more clearly why, for example, a closed rule was used on a particular bill, and
legislators could note if they bargained for a provision or were simply forced to accept it.
The history would never be perfect, and sometimes legislators would have incentives to
strategically distort the record. But any improvements would simplify the judicial task.
Note too that clearer legislative histories—especially under a regime of legalized
logrolling—would improve political transparency.
Beyond clarifying their legislative histories, legislators could insulate bills from a
charge of riding by voting unanimously not to divide the question.271 According to
Robert’s Rules of Order,
When a motion relating to a certain subject contains several parts, each of which
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is capable of standing as a complete proposition if the others are removed, it can
be divided into two or more propositions to be considered and voted on as distinct
questions, by the assembly's adopting a motion to divide the question in a
specified manner.272
Prior to voting on a bill, someone in the legislature could move that the bill at issue be
divided. A unanimous vote not to divide the question would be clear evidence that the
bill does not contain a rider; if it did, at least some of the rider’s opponents would vote to
divide the question. Of course, failure to achieve a unanimous vote should not lead to a
presumption that riders are present. Even independently popular bills and beneficial
logrolls can have harmful effects on a minority. That minority should not be permitted to
sabotage a bill by disingenuously raising judicial scrutiny. This divide-the-question
technique could be used under open rules.
Even with the sorts of information outlined above, courts would make some
mistakes and strike down logrolled or even popular provisions. However, there is no
reason to suppose they would make more errors under the public choice framework than
they would under the approach they currently employ. Moreover, the costs of judicial
error would be mitigated to some extent if this framework deterred legislators from
attaching riders in the first place. If judges made clear that they would vigorously review
all challenged statutes for riders, the deterrent effect would increase. Indeed, legislators
themselves—once they trusted that courts would not interfere with their logrolls—could
use the threat of litigation to prevent colleagues from attaching riders.273
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For all of the reasons presented, courts should adopt a presumption against riders
and declare any bill containing one to be in violation of the single subject rule. This
approach comports with the definition of a single subject provided in the previous
section. A rider is neither popular on its face nor the result of legislative bargaining, so
any bill containing a rider embraces more than one subject.

C. Courts Must Enforce the Title Requirement
Assuming they do not detect a rider, which would constitute a single subject
violation and obviate the need for further analysis, courts adjudicating a single subject
dispute must check for compliance with the title requirement. If the title gives general
notice of all of the issues the bill touches upon, the title requirement is satisfied. If a
bill’s contents are not expressed in the title, it violates the single subject rule. This
approach allows the definition of a single subject to be finalized. A bill can be said to
embrace but one subject when all of its provisions command majority support due to their
individual merits or legislative bargaining and the title gives notice of the bill’s contents.
The rationale for enforcing the title requirement is the same under the public
choice approach as under traditional single subject jurisprudence: to improve political
transparency. As Part III argued, the quality of legislation will improve if legislators are
aware of bills’ contents. Clear titles will make it easier for legislators to understand what
they are voting on. More importantly, citizens must be able to monitor their
representatives to ensure that legislative activity is carried out with their best interests in
mind. Clear titles will simplify the task of determining what issues legislators are voting
for and against.
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Reviewing the adequacy of bills’ titles will necessarily involve some discretion.
The line between minor, technical issues—inclusion of which would make titles
inordinately long—and major issues that implicate citizens’ interests is vague. However,
the discretion under the public choice approach is no different from that in traditional
single subject jurisprudence. The tests are essentially the same, and courts have carried
out title analyses thousands of times. To focus the issue, courts should insist that litigants
point to specific legislative provisions that failed to appear in the title and articulate the
effects of that failure on their interests.
Under a regime of permissible logrolling, the title requirement could become
increasingly important. Bills could expand in terms of length and the range of issues they
address. Ideally, titles would become crisper, pithily expressing the contents of
complicated acts. In practice, titles may simply grow beyond the point of usefulness to
average citizens. This implicates the broader relationship between logrolling and
political transparency. As discussed in Part III, strict application of the single subject rule
cuts against transparency by obscuring legislative bargains. Conversely, failure to limit
the scope of acts could lead to bills so vast they are incomprehensible. Optimal
application of the single subject rule would fall between these poles, allowing some
measures to be combined so that tradeoffs can more easily perceived but placing an upper
limit on bills in the interest of transparency.
Unfortunately, optimal application is infeasible. Courts cannot design a rule that
balances the gains and losses to political transparency from logrolling. In the abstract,
such a rule would be too vague to provide legislators with a predictable restraint on their
logrolling. In practice, precise application of such a rule would require more information
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than courts willever possess . In lieu of an optimal rule, courts should adopt a
presumption about the logrolling-transparency tradeoff that minimizes social costs. I
propose they presume that logrolling always improves transparency. This presumption is
based on two arguments.
First, a certain amount of logrolling within a given bill enhances transparency.
Only when logrolling passes that threshold does transparency begin to suffer. The point
at which logrolling confuses rather than clarifies is probably close to the point where
legislators elect to stop logrolling. Otherwise they risk confusing themselves and
agreeing to a harmful exchange. Second, most citizens do not monitor their
representatives by reading bills and their titles. They get their political information from
the media, interest groups, and politicians themselves.274 Even if a given bill and its title
are too voluminous and complex to be comprehensible to average citizens, it is unlikely
to confound intrepid reporters and interest groups whose job is to follow the political
process.275
Judicious enforcement of the title requirement could improve the quality of laws
and help citizens monitor their representatives. This would ensure that legislators act in
their constituents’ best interests, spreading the gains from political bargaining not just
among politicians but among the public as well.
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whether logrolling can actually enhance transparency—after all, such groups should be able to identify
political tradeoffs even if they are splintered across multiple bills. Although this argument has some force,
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D. Courts Should Not Sever Bills that Violate the Single Subject Rule
Under the public choice approach to single subject disputes, violations of the rule
could occur in twoinstances: when a bill contains a rider and when the contents of a bill
are not adequately expressed in the title. When either of these violations is detected, the
bill at issue should be struck down in its entirety. This prescription is not universally
accepted. As discussed, some courts prefer to sever just the offending provisions of a bill
rather than the complete act.276
The problem with severance is that it fails to provide legislators with an incentive
not to ride their favored provisions. Indeed, severing encourages legislators to attach
riders: with any luck, they will go undetected and become law, and if they are detected,
they will simply be removed and can be reattached to another bill. In either case, the
popular provisions of the act will stand, and legislators responsible for riders will face
limited political backlash. In contrast, if the presence of a rider leads to invalidation of an
entire bill, legislators who attached the rider will pay a higher price. Other legislators,
whose hard-fought political bargain was undone because of the rider, may be incensed
and less likely to bargain with the culprits, and citizens may be enraged by the delay or
failure to enact important legislation.277 Fear of these penalties could prevent riders from
being attached in the first place.
When riders are absent but a bill fails to satisfy the title requirement, the entire
bill should again be struck down. Such bills are the product of legislative compromise.
Lawmakers accept some provisions they dislike to secure passage of others that they
favor. To sever some components of such bills while upholding others would pervert the
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A similar argument is articulated in Ventura, 610 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting).
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underlying bargain. Some legislators would receive their favored provisions without
having to tolerate unfavorable measures that fortuitously were severed. Other legislators
would receive nothing in exchange for their support of the bill, their preferred provisions
having been removed. A superior approach to severance would be complete nullification.
This would unwind the legislative bargain but not pervert it. Lawmakers would be free to
renegotiate a new version of the bill, having lost some valuable time but not their votes.

CONCLUSION
Despite 150 years of life and over 8,000 cases, the single subject rule remains a
source of uncertainty and dissatisfaction. Judicial tests for enforcing the rule are abstract
and can lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results. The root of the problem is the
broad language of the rule itself and a series of misunderstandings about the legislative
process. Given the ubiquity of single subject rules and the frequency with which they are
litigated, judges, legislators, and citizens alike would benefit from a new approach to this
area of law.
Public choice theory turns much of single subject jurisprudence on its head,
offering compelling arguments in favor of logrolling and against riding, and demanding
that more attention be paid to the comprehensibility of bills. More generally, it offers a
framework for understanding legislative procedures, political bargaining, and the true
merits of a single subject rule. This paper draws on public choice to develop a workable
definition of a single subject. This definition in turn provides the basis for a systematic
test for single subject violations. The test offers a coherent analytical framework for
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settling single subject disputes, and its application could improve the outcomes of the
legislative process.
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